Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis by Kaplow, Louis
 
Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,
42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992).
Published Version doi:10.2307/1372840
Accessed February 18, 2015 10:12:58 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:10611784
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAADuke University School of Law
Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis
Author(s): Louis Kaplow
Source: Duke Law Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Dec., 1992), pp. 557-629
Published by: Duke University School of Law
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1372840
Accessed: 22/03/2010 10:42
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=dusl.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Duke University School of Law is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Duke
Law Journal.
http://www.jstor.orgRULES VERSUS STANDARDS: 
AN  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
LouIS  KAPLOWt 
This  Article  offers  an  economic  analysis  of  the  extent  to 
which  legal  commands  should  be  promulgated  as  rules  or  stan- 
dards.  Two  dimensions  of  the problem  are emphasized.  First, the 
choice  between  rules  and  standards  affects  costs:  Rules  typically 
are more costly than standards to create, whereas standards tend to 
be  more  costly for  individuals  to  interpret when  deciding  how  to 
act and for  an adjudicator to apply to past  conduct. Second,  when 
individuals  can  determine the application  of  rules to  their contem- 
plated  acts  more  cheaply,  conduct  is  more  likely  to  reflect  the 
content of previously promulgated rules than of standards that will 
be  given  content  only  after individuals  act.  The Article  considers 
how  these factors  influence  the manner  in  which  rules  and  stan- 
dards should  be designed, and explores the circumstances in which 
rules  or  standards  are  likely  to  be  preferable.  The  Article  also 
addresses the level of  detail with which laws should  be formulated 
and  applied,  emphasizing  how  this  question  concerning  the  laws' 
relative simplicity or  complexity  can  be distinguished from  that of 
whether laws  are  given  content  ex  ante  (rules)  or  ex  post  (stan- 
dards).  In  so  doing,  it  illuminates  concerns  about  the  over-  and 
underinclusiveness of  rules relative to standards. 
t  Professor,  Harvard Law  School  and  Research  Associate,  National  Bureau  of  Eco- 
nomic  Research.  I  am  grateful  for  comments  from  Lucian  Bebchuk,  James  Boyle,  Scott 
Brewer,  David  Charny, Erwin  Chemerinsky,  Stephen  Choi,  Richard  Fallon,  Marcel  Kahan, 
Jeremy  Paul,  Richard  Posner,  Frederick  Schauer,  Steven  Shavell,  and  participants  in 
workshops  at  the  University  of  Chicago,  University  of  Connecticut,  and Harvard Universi- 
ty  law  schools. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This  Article  offers  an  economic  analysis of  the  extent  to 
which legal  commands should be  promulgated as  rules or  stan- 
dards, a question that has received substantial  attention from legal 
commentators.1  Arguments about  and  definitions of  rules  and 
standards commonly emphasize the  distinction between  whether 
the law is given content ex ante or ex post.2 For example, a rule 
1.  The two most substantial  attempts to analyze the choice from an economic per- 
spective are Colin S. Diver, The Optimal  Precision  of Administrative  Rules, 93 YALE  L.J. 
65  (1983), and  Isaac Ehrlich &  Richard A.  Posner, An  Economic Analysis of  Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257  (1974).  See also KENNETH  C.  DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE:  A  PRELIMINARY  INQUIRY  (1969); Anthony I. Ogus, Quantitative  Rules and Judi- 
cial  Decision Making, in  THE ECONOMIC  APPROACH  TO  LAW 210  (Paul Burrows & 
Cento G. Veljanovski  eds., 1981). Other prominent  discussions,  often emphasizing  defini- 
tions and jurisprudential  concerns, include P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT  S. SUMMERS,  FORM 
AND SUBSTANCE  IN ANGLO-AMERICAN  LAW: A  COMPARATIVE  STUDY IN LEGAL REA- 
SONING,  LEGAL THEORY  AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS  (1987);  H.L.A.  HART, THE CONCEPT 
OF LAW 126-31  (1961);  HENRY M.  HART &  ALBERT M.  SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 
155-58  (tent. ed. 1958); MARK KELMAN,  A  GUIDE TO CRITICAL  LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 
(1987);  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  THE PROBLEMS  OF JURISPRUDENCE  42-53  (1990);  ROSCOE 
POUND, AN  INTRODUCTION  TO THE PHILOSOPHY  OF LAW 115-23  (1922);  FREDERICK 
SCHAUER,  PLAYING  BY THE RULES: A  PHILOSOPHICAL  EXAMINATION  OF RULE-BASED 
DECISIONMAKING  IN  LAW AND  IN  LIFE (1991);  ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE  AND 
POLITICS  88-100 (1975); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of  Rules, 35 U.  CHI. L. REV. 
14, 22-29 (1967); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance  in Private Law Adjudication,  89 
HARV.  L. REV. 1685 (1976); Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy  of Sources and Forms in Different 
Systems  of  Law,  7  TUL. L.  REV. 475,  482-87  (1933). 
2.  See,  e.g.,  HART, supra  note 1, at  127-29;  HART &  SACKS, supra  note 1, at 157 
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may entail an advance determination of  what conduct is permis- 
sible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator.  (A rule might 
prohibit "driving  in excess of 55 miles per hour on expressways.") 
A  standard may entail leaving both specification of what conduct 
is permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator.  (A  standard 
might prohibit "driving at  an excessive speed on  expressways."3) 
This Article will adopt such a definition, in which the only distinc- 
tion  between  rules  and  standards  is  the  extent to  which  efforts  to 
give  content  to  the  law  are  undertaken before  or  after individuals 
act.4 Other properties of rules and standards,  including many em- 
phasized  in the jurisprudential  literature,  will be noted only in passing.5 
("The  wise  draftsman  .  .  .  asks  himself,  how  many of  the  details  of  this  settlement  ought 
to  be  postponed  to  another  day,  when  the  decisions  can  be  more  wisely  and  efficiently 
and  perhaps  more  readily  made?").  There  is,  however,  substantial  variation  in  the  use  of 
terminology  and  in  the  content  of  definitions,  sometimes  even  by  a  single  author.  The 
choice  of  "rules" and  "standards" as  terms  may  contribute  to  the  confusion.  Outside  the 
debate  over  formulation  of  the  law,  the  terms  are  often  used  interchangeably.  Dictionar- 
ies  include  as  common  meanings  of  "rule," "a  standard  of  judgment"  and  "a  regulating 
principle."  WEBSTER'S  NEW COLLEGIATE  DICTIONARY  1012  (1977).  Common  meanings 
for  "standard" include  "something  set  up  and  established  by  authority  as  a  rule  for  the 
measure  of  quantity,  weight,  extent,  value,  or  quality." Id. at  1133.  "Criterion" is  listed  as 
a  synonym  for  both  terms.  Thus,  one  is  not  surprised when  Ronald  Dworkin  uses  "stan- 
dards" to  encompass  both  concepts  as  defined  here,  and uses  "principles" in  place  of  the 
more  conventional  "standards." See  Dworkin,  supra  note  1,  at  22-25.  (I  refer  here  to 
Dworkin's  discussion  of  the  rules  and  standards  question,  as  distinct  from  much  of  his 
other  jurisprudential  work  in  which  his  use  of  the  term  "principles"  plays  a  different 
role.)  In  this  Article,  I  will  attempt  to  minimize  confusion  by  using  the  term  "law" (and 
various  derivatives)  to  refer  generically  to  legal  commands. 
3.  This  example  would  not  differ  from  that  of  the  rule  if  all  adjudicators  held  the 
view  that  an  "excessive  speed  on  expressways"  was  any  speed  "in excess  of  55  miles  per 
hour."  Yet  for  purposes  of  this  illustration,  assume  that  the  inquiry  into  "excessive 
speed"  is  relatively  open-ended  and  requires  real  effort  on  the  part of  the  decisionmaker 
in  many  cases.  See  infra Part  II  (a  seemingly  open-ended  standard might  be  applied  in  a 
more  straightforward fashion);  Section  III(B)  (whether  a  law  is  a  standard  is  determined 
by  how  it  is  understood  rather  than  by  the  language  in  which  it  is  formulated);  subsec- 
tion  IV(B)(3)  (government  undertakes  a  study,  publishing  the  results  but  not  embodying 
them  in  a  regulation). 
4.  In  particular,  as  explored  in  Part  II,  this  Article  distinguishes  the  question  of 
when  a  legal  command  is  given  content  from  how  much  detail  is  used  in  differentiating 
cases.  Often,  this  latter  dimension  is expressly  included.  See, e.g.,  Frederick  Schauer,  Rules 
and  the  Rule  of  Law,  14  HARV. J.L.  &  PUB.  POL'Y 645,  650-51  (1991)  ("Where  the 
categories  of  decision  are  both  large  and  opaque,  the  dimension  of  ruleness  is  greatest, 
and  where  the  categories  are  narrow  and  more  transparent  to  background  justifications, 
the  constraints  of  ruleness  are  minimized.").  But  see  Ruth  Gavison,  Comment:  Legal 
Theory and  the  Role  of  Rules,  14  HARV. J.L.  &  PUB. POL'Y 727,  747-48  (1991)  (suggest- 
ing  that  only  the  strength  of  entrenchment  and  not  breadth  be  incorporated  in  the  con- 
cept  of  ruleness). 
5.  This  Article  will  not  address  such  issues  as  whether  binding  rules  are  possible, 
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The language of this Article will follow the common practice 
of referring to rules and standards  as if one were comparing pure 
types, even  though legal commands mix the  two  in  varying de- 
grees.6 One can think of  the choice between rules and standards 
given the limits of  language, or whether rules can be  interpreted  independently  of  their 
underlying  justifications  (which may be standards).  See generally  JOSEPH  RAZ, PRACTICAL 
REASON AND NORMS 49-84  (1990);  SCHAUER,  supra  note 1. Rather, the Article adopts 
the perspective-which I believe is amply defended in the relevant literature (and which 
one  might have thought needed no defense)-that  it  often is  meaningful to  say that a 
law  has  been  given  some  content  ex  ante, which  the  adjudicator should,  could,  and  would 
take  into  account.  See,  e.g.,  Frederick  Schauer,  Rules  and  the  Rule-Following  Argument,  3 
CAN. J.L.  &  JURISPRUDENCE  187  (1990)  [hereinafter  Schauer,  Rules].  Moreover,  as  many 
of  the  examples  (such  as  the  Internal  Revenue  Code  and  OSHA  regulations)  suggest,  the 
realm  in  which  this  perspective  is  applicable  to  a  great  extent  and  is  practically important 
is  immense.  See  also  the  examples  that  Diver,  supra  note  1,  explores  in  depth.  (Perhaps 
it  is  the  refusal  to  consider  routine  applications  of  the  law  that  leads  some,  such  as  Pi- 
erre  Schlag,  Rules  and  Standards, 33  UCLA  L.  REV. 379,  400-18  (1985),  to  believe  that 
considering  the  virtues  and  vices  of  rules  and  standards  is  a  meaningless  endeavor.)  Sec- 
tions  II(A)  and  IV(A)  touch  on  these  jurisprudential concerns. 
A  concern  related  to  whether  rules  can  be  binding  is  whether  there  is  any  content 
to  a  rule  as  long  as  a  standard can  trump the  rule.  When  standards  can  be  employed  ex 
post  to  trump  rules,  the  value  of  rules  might  be  significantly  eroded  to  the  extent  their 
purpose  was  primarily  to  constrain  adjudicators'  discretion  for  fear  of  abuse.  See  infra 
note  142  and  accompanying  text.  But  to  the  extent  that  adjudicators  are  faithful  execu- 
tors  of  legal  commands,  they  would  choose  to  use  ex  ante  determinations  to  an  appropri- 
ate  extent.  (In  fact,  pressures  of  time  and  cost  would,  as  a  practical  matter,  give  them  a 
great-perhaps  an  excessive-incentive  to  do  so.)  The  focus  in  this  Article  is  on  the 
value  of  ex  ante  determinations,  not  on  whether  such  determinations  should  be  or  can  be 
made  absolutely  binding.  See, e.g.,  infra subsection  IV(B)(3).  The  analysis  emphasizes  how 
laws-both  rules  and  standards-will  actually  be  applied  and  the  relative  difficulty  of 
predicting  their  application.  Thus,  a  law  is  "rule-like"  if  it  in  fact  facilitates  resolution  of 
cases  ex  post  and  makes  prediction  easier  ex  ante,  even  if  it  expressly  allows  the  adjudi- 
cator  to  create  exceptions  ex  post  (for  example,  with  the  suggestion  that  "these  rules 
apply  unless  some  other  result  is  appropriate  in  light  of  the  considerations  motivating 
formulation  of  this  law").  See  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1,  at  98-99  (even  if  the  adjudicator 
is  explicitly  empowered  to  ignore  the  rule,  it  may  produce  many  virtues  of  rules,  al- 
though  not  that  of  allocating  power  to  one  other  than  the  adjudicator).  For  discussions  of 
the  jurisprudence  of  presumptive  rules,  see,  e.g.,  RAZ, supra,  at  59-62;  SCHAUER,  supra 
note  1,  at  108-11  (even  "mere"  rules  of  thumb  may  provide  guidance);  Schauer,  supra 
note  4.  On  the  related  question  of  exceptions  to  rules,  see  Frederick  Schauer,  Exceptions, 
58  U.  CHI. L.  REV. 871,  893-98  (1991). 
The  view  that  aspects  of  rules  can  usefully  be  analyzed  while  setting  aside  related 
issues  of  legal  theory  is  not  novel.  See,  e.g.,  Gavison,  supra  note  4,  at  730,  768-70  (con- 
cluding  that  "we  should  discuss  the  role  of  rules  in  law  on  its  own  merits,  without  trying 
to  implicate  general  legal  theory  in  the  discussion,"  but  noting  similarities  in  scholars'  use 
of  theories  of  law  and  formal  attributes  of  decisionmaking).  In  part,  the  separation  is 
appropriate  because  many  properties  of  rules  (and  standards),  including  much  of  what  is 
explored  in  this  Article,  are  not  unique  to  legal  rules,  as  distinct  from  rules  followed  in 
other  realms  of  life.  See,  e.g.,  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1; Schauer,  Precedent,  39  STAN. L. 
REV. 571,  572,  602-03  (1987)  [hereinafter  Schauer,  Precedent]. 
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as involving the extent to  which a given aspect of  a  legal com- 
mand should be  resolved in  advance or  left  to  an enforcement 
authority to consider. Thus, advance determination of  the appro- 
priate speed on expressways  under normal conditions, or even of 
the criteria that will be relevant in adjudicating  reasonable speed 
(safety and the value of time, but not the brand of automobile or 
the  particular driver's skill),  are  "rule-like" when  compared to 
asking an adjudicator  to attach whatever legal consequence seems 
appropriate in light of  whatever norms and facts seem relevant.7 
Yet  the  same  advance determination would  be  "standard-like" 
when compared to a precise advance determination  of what consti- 
tutes  normal conditions and  what  constitutes reasonable speed 
under various exceptional circumstances. 
The analysis in Part I examines the relative desirability  of ex 
ante versus ex post creation of the law in terms of legal costs and 
the extent to which individuals'  behavior conforms to the law.8  It 
focuses on an intentionally simple example-made  more complex 
later-that  is  used  to  identify fundamental differences between 
rules and standards. The example has three stages: (1)  A  law is 
promulgated, either as  a  rule or  as  a  standard. (2)  Individuals 
decide how to  act. Being imperfectly informed of the law's com- 
mands, they either act based on  their best guess of  the  law, or 
they acquire legal advice, which allows them to  act with knowl- 
edge  of  a  rule or  a prediction of  the application of  a  standard. 
(3) After individuals act, an adjudicator  determines how the gov- 
erning law applies. Rules are more costly to promulgate  than stan- 
dards because rules involve advance determinations of  the  law's 
content, whereas standards are more costly for legal advisors to 
(as  when  two  rules  arguably  govern  and  some  principle  must  be  invoked  to  choose  be- 
tween  the  rules).  Even  focusing  on  a  single  step  in  reaching  a  legal  conclusion,  a particu- 
lar  law  will  have  qualities  of  rules  and  of  standards, with  competing  formulations  differ- 
ing  in  the  degree  to  which  they  are rule-  or  standard-like.  See also  infra note  83.  An  im- 
portant  mixed  type  is  the  presumptive  rule,  in  which  a  rule  applies  unless  there  appears 
to  be  sufficient  reason  not  to  apply  it  (and  in  which  the  decisionmaker  does  not  first 
conduct  a  full  inquiry  to  determine  whether  applying  the  rule  is  correct).  See  Gavison, 
supra  note  4,  at  750-52;  supra  note  5. 
7.  Cf. Thomas  C.  Arthur,  Workable Antitrust Law:  The Statutory Approach  to  Anti- 
trust, 62 TUL. L.  REV. 1163,  1225-28  (1988)  (rejecting  sharp dichotomy  between  rules  and 
standards,  instead  advocating  a  middle  position  in  which  the  legislature  identifies  goals 
and  offers  examples  as  guides  for  courts). 
8.  The  analysis emphasizes  how  laws  affect  ex ante behavior  rather than other  goals, 
some  of  which  are  noted  in  Section  III(E). 
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predict or enforcement authorities to  apply because they require 
later determinations  of the law's content. 
To  illustrate the analysis, consider the problem of  regulating 
the disposal of hazardous  substances.  For chemicals used frequent- 
ly  in  settings with common characteristics-such as  dry cleaning 
and automotive fluids-a  rule will tend to  be  desirable. If there 
will  be  many enforcement actions, the  added cost  from having 
resolved the issue on a wholesale basis at the promulgation  stage 
will  be  outweighed by  the  benefit of  having avoided additional 
costs  repeatedly incurred in  giving content to  a  standard on  a 
retail basis.9  Moreover, with regard to  the countless acts of  indi- 
viduals subject to these laws, a rule will tend to be better as well. 
Because learning about a  rule is cheaper, individuals may spend 
less in learning about the law, and may be better guided by a rule 
since the law's content can be more readily ascertained. 
Contrast this result to that in the case of chemicals used rare- 
ly, and in settings that vary substantially.  Designing a rule that ac- 
counts for every relevant contingency would be wasteful, as most 
would never arise. Although it might be more difficult and costly 
for an individual  and an enforcement authority  to apply a standard 
in a particular  instance, such an application need be made only if 
its unique set of circumstances  actually arises. Thus when frequen- 
cy is low, a standard  tends to be preferable. 
Two features of this example are worth highlighting.  First, the 
frequency of individual behavior and of adjudication  is of central 
importance. Note in this regard that a law may still govern much 
behavior even though adjudications-which receive more emphasis 
in legal commentary-are  rare, whether because most acts do not 
give rise to a lawsuit or because most cases are settled.10  Laws in 
which the  frequency of  application in recurring fact scenarios is 
9.  Thus,  when  discussing  presumptive  rules,  Gavison  notes  that  requiring  the 
decisionmaker  to  examine  all  relevant  factors  to  determine  whether  a  rule  should  apply 
would  not  make  all  cases  difficult  to  decide  but  would  "make  all  cases  time-consuming, 
in  ways  that  are  extremely  wasteful."  Gavison,  supra  note  4,  at  750;  see  HENRY  J. 
FRIENDLY,  THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE  AGENCIES:  THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFI- 
NITION OF  STANDARDS  24  (1962);  RAZ, supra  note 5, at 59-60;  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1, 
at  145-49  &  n.14;  cf.  RICHARD A.  POSNER, ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS OF LAW ?  20.4,  at 
547-48  (4th  ed.  1992)  (similar  effect  of  precedent  treated  as  a  rule  by  subsequent 
decisionmakers);  Schauer,  Precedent, supra  note  5,  at  599  (same). 
10.  Isaac  Ehrlich  and  Richard  Posner  have  noted  that  costs  of  legal  advice  at  the 
consultation  stage  may  be  greater  than  for  advice  in  litigation.  Ehrlich  &  Posner,  supra 
note  1,  at  270. 
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high include many traffic laws, aspects of the law of damages  (how 
to  value  disability,  loss  of  life,  or lost  profits),  regulations  govern- 
ing  health  and  safety,  and  provisions  of  the  federal  income  tax 
(some  of  which  apply  to  millions  of  individuals  and  billions  of 
transactions).  In  contrast,  some  laws  govern  more  heterogeneous 
behavior,  in  which  each  relevant  type  of  act  may  be  rare."  For 
example,  the  law of  negligence  applies  to  a wide  array of  complex 
accident  scenarios,  many  of  which  are  materially  different  from 
each  other  and,  when  considered  in  isolation,  are  unlikely  to  oc- 
cur.12 
Second,  the  advantage  of  rules  at  the  stage  involving  individ- 
uals'  behavior  depends  on  whether  individuals  choose  to  acquire 
legal  advice  before  they  act.  If  the  benefits  of  learning  the  law's 
content  are  substantial  and  the  cost  (whether  of  hiring  legal  ex- 
perts  or learning more  on  one's  own)  is not  too  great, individuals' 
behavior  under  both  rules  and  standards will  tend  to  conform  to 
the  law's commands. The  advantage of  rules in this case  would  be 
that  the  cost  of  learning the  law is  reduced.  If,  however,  the  cost 
of  predicting  standards is  high,  individuals will  not  choose  to  be- 
come  as  well  informed  about  how  standards would  apply  to  their 
behavior.  The  advantage  of  rules  in  this  case  would  be  improved 
legal  compliance.  Thus,  even  if  an  enforcement  authority  were  to 
give  the  same  content  (or "better" content)  to  a standard as might 
have  been  included  in  a rule, the  rule might  induce  behavior  that 
is more  in accord with underlying norms. 
After  developing  these  ideas,  the  framework  is  extended  in 
two ways. First, the  analysis is reconsidered  in light of  the possibil- 
ity  that  a  standard  might  be  converted  into  a  rule  through  the 
creation  of  a  precedent.  Second,  an  inquiry  is  made  into  how 
much effort should and would be invested  in promulgating and ap- 
plying laws. It is noted,  for example,  that more should be spent  on 
11.  Heterogeneity  is  emphasized  because  acts  are  only  frequent  in  the  relevant  sense 
if  the  acts  have  enough  in  common  that  they  should  be  treated  in  the  same  manner. 
Thus,  negligence  cases  are  frequent,  although  many  types  of  negligence  cases  are not.  See 
infra  Section  III(B);  cf.  Werner  Z.  Hirsch,  Reducing  Law's  Uncertainty and  Complexity, 
21  UCLA  L.  REV.  1233,  1240-41  (1974)  (discussing  frequency  versus  heterogeneity  in 
determining  whether  laws  should  be  more  precise  so  as  to  avoid  uncertainty). 
12.  Roscoe  Pound  has  stated  that  "no  two  cases  of  negligence  have  been  alike  or 
ever  will  be  alike."  POUND, supra  note  1,  at  142.  It  is  less  obvious  whether  the  differ- 
ences  are  typically  of  sufficient  importance  to  justify  an  independent  inquiry in  each  case 
or  whether  juries  in  fact  respond  to  all  conceivable  subtle  differences,  issues  explored  in 
Part  II. 
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determining the  appropriate resolution of  issues when a  rule is 
designed once for many cases than when applying a standard (ad- 
judication) or predicting the application of  a  standard (legal ad- 
vice) in a single case. Finally, Part I concludes by observing that 
the  problem of  choosing between  rules  and  standards can  be 
viewed as one concerning  how the government should acquire and 
disseminate information  about the appropriate  content of the law. 
Part II seeks to illuminate  the intersection between the debate 
over rules and standards (ex ante versus ex post  creation of  the 
law) and the debate over the appropriate  degree of detail in legal 
commands. The focus is on the familiar suggestion that rules tend 
to  be  over- and underinclusive relative to  standards.13  This Part 
indicates that the suggestion is misleading because typically it im- 
plicitly compares a complex standard and a relatively simple rule, 
whereas both rules and standards can in fact be  quite simple or 
highly detailed in their operation. 
For  rules, the  potential variation in  complexity is  familiar, 
even if often ignored. A motor vehicle code could specify a single 
speed limit, a handful (one each for expressways,  city streets, and 
alleys), or a plethora (identifying  different types of roads, vehicles, 
weather conditions, traffic densities, and driver characteristics).  For 
standards,  this point has two important  dimensions. Standards  may 
admit few or many considerations  in determining  their application. 
A  standard that one  not drive at an excessive speed may allow 
only  time  and safety considerations or  may also  permit energy 
conservation  considerations;  it may deem relevant only road condi- 
tions or may also take into account vehicle types. There is, howev- 
er,  another important dimension that  is  commonly overlooked 
when analyzing standards:  the level of detail actually employed by 
13.  See,  e.g.,  Ehrlich  &  Posner,  supra  note  1,  at  268-70;  Kennedy,  supra  note  1,  at 
1689,  1695; William  H.  Simon,  Legality,  Bureaucracy, and  Class  in  the  Welfare System,  92 
YALE L.J.  1198,  1202,  1227  (1983).  Coleman,  in  contrast,  emphasizes  that  "rules  are  nec- 
essarily  under-  and  over-inclusive  with  respect  to  the  sets  of  reasons  that  support  or 
ground  them"  (instead  of  in  comparison  to  standards).  Jules  L.  Coleman,  Rules  and  So- 
cial  Facts,  14  HARV. J.  L.  &  PUB. POL'Y 703,  710  (1991); see  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1,  at 
31-34,  50.  Schauer  describes  rules  as  "entrenched  generalizations  likely  to  be  under-  and 
over-inclusive  in  particular  cases,"  in  contrast  to  "particularistic  decisionmaking,  which 
aims  to  optimize  for  each  case  and  treats  normative  generalizations  as  only  temporary 
and  transparent approximations."  Schauer, supra  note  4,  at  646; see  id.  at  648-49.  As  will 
be  discussed  further in  Section  I(D)  and  Part II,  this  sort  of  comparison,  while  not  inher- 
ently  misleading,  is  often  understood  in  a  manner  that  provides  an  inaccurate  picture 
when  considering  how  systems  of  rules  and  standards should  or  do  operate. 
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the adjudicator.  A  standard that one not drive at excessive speed 
might well permit consideration  of dozens of factors. But if ninety- 
nine out of  a  hundred juries make their decisions based on  the 
same two or three factors, although the other factors are relevant 
in principle, the de facto standard  might usefully be described as a 
rather simple  one.14 
Thus, there are simple and complex rules as well as simple 
and complex standards.15  Moreover, as a matter of  legal practice, 
it is not always the case that rule systems are simple compared to 
the standards that could be adopted in their place. Consider the 
federal income tax. It hardly seems plausible that a standard re- 
quiring individuals to pay "their appropriate  share of  the federal 
government's revenue needs," applied case by case,'6 would gen- 
erate a more detailed law-one  that took into account more fac- 
tors, in more intricate ways-than  the one embodied in the Inter- 
nal Revenue Code and its accompanying  regulations. 
The conceptual distinction  between the questions of how com- 
plex a law should be and whether any aspect of its detail is best 
determined ex ante or ex post has practical  importance.  For exam- 
ple,  a complex standard might be preferred to  a simple rule be- 
cause of  its complexity or because of  the  advantages of  ex post 
formulation, or both. As  a result, in some instances in which the 
complex standard is superior, it may be that complexity is better 
than simplicity, but a rule-a  complex rule-would  be preferable 
14.  See  Stephen  G.  Gilles,  Rule-Based  Negligence  and  the  Regulation  of  Activity  Lev- 
els,  21  J.  LEGAL STUD. 319,  321-27  (1992)  (emphasizing  rule-like  elements  of  negligence 
and  standard-like elements  of  strict liability).  Juries may  adopt  a simple  approach because 
the  factors  they  can  readily  understand  or  that  appear  most  salient  are  few  in  number. 
Alternatively,  jury  instructions  may  narrow  their  focus,  see,  e.g.,  JOHN DICKINSON,  AD- 
MINISTRATIVE  JUSTICE AND  THE SUPREMACY  OF  LAW  IN  THE UNITED STATES 143 
(1927)  (giving  examples  involving  notice  of  dishonor  of  negotiable  instruments  and  due 
care  in  tort  law),  although  in  this  case  the  standard may  have  been  transformed  into  a 
rule  to  some  extent. 
15.  Colin  Diver  offers  an example  with  three  formulations  for  a law determining  who 
may  pilot  commercial  aircraft: (1)  No  one  over  age  60;  (2)  No  one  who  poses  an  unrea- 
sonable  risk of  accident; (3)  No  one  who  falls  in  any  of  a  number  of  categories  detailing 
combinations  of  values  of  variables  that  bear  on  accident  risk.  See  Diver,  supra  note  1, 
at  69.  In  this  example,  (1)  is  a  simple  rule  and  (3)  a  complex  rule.  The  standard is  (2), 
which  on  its  face  appears  complex,  in  that  in  principle  it  admits  any  consideration.  Diver 
then  notes  the  possibility  that  all  those  applying  (2)  understand  it  to  mean  anyone  over 
60,  see  id.,  which  would  be  a  simple  de facto  standard. 
16.  And  without  the  creation  of  precedents  that  would  make  the  standard more  rule- 
like.  See  infra  Section  I(C). 
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to  a  standard; or,  it  may  be  that  a standard is  better  than  a  rule, 
but  a  simple  standard  would  be  preferable  to  a  complex  one.17 
For  example,  a  standard  (implicitly  complex)  that  one  dispose  of 
toxic  substances  "appropriately" may  be  preferable  to  a  rule  that 
simply prohibits  the  dumping of  petroleum  byproducts  into  bodies 
of  water.  But,  at  least  for  substances  frequently  used  in  common 
settings-such  as  dry  cleaning  and  automotive  fluids-a  complex 
rule  detailing  the  appropriate  manner  of  disposal  for  different 
substances  may be  even  better.  Part II discusses  briefly  the  sort  of 
analysis  that  is  pertinent  to  a  determination  of  the  appropriate 
level  of  detail  (for example,  the extent  to which different  substanc- 
es  and  contexts  should  be  distinguished),  noting  how  it  differs 
from  that in Part I  (which  concerns  whether  the  appropriate man- 
ner  of  disposal  should  be  determined  in  advance,  or  only  after 
individuals  act, in an adjudication). 
Part  III  extends  the  framework  in  a  number  of  ways.  First, 
this  Part considers  the  possibility  that  standards are  more  accessi- 
ble  to  actors  than  rules  are,  contrary  to  the  suggestion  in  Part  I. 
Second,  it  examines  why  it  is  difficult  to  formulate  some  laws  as 
rules,  in  the  process  elaborating  on  the  definition  of  rules  and 
standards  and  the  notion  of  frequency  of  application  emphasized 
in Part I. Third, it assesses  further the  consequences  of  individuals' 
acquiring legal  advice.  The  relevant  question  involves  whether  the 
costs  of  advice  are warranted by  the  benefits  from  the  changes  in 
individuals'  behavior  that  result  from  their  being  better  informed 
about the  law. Fourth, it discusses risk aversion. Finally, it analyzes 
objectives  of  the  law  other  than  deterrence.  For  example,  when 
legal  remedies  are  nonmonetary  (injunctions,  incarceration), 
individuals'  behavior  after  adjuducation  is  directly  affected  by  the 
law, in addition  to  or instead  of  being  affected  ex ante in anticipa- 
tion  of  how  the  law  will  apply  (the  focus  of  the  previous  discus- 
sion). 
Part  IV  comments  on  the  interpretation  of  the  analysis.  It 
considers  briefly  the  relevance  of  the  branch  of  government  in- 
volved  in  the  promulgation  and  application  of  law,  the  role  of 
judge  and jury, abuse  of  power,  political  influences  on  rule formu- 
lation,  and the  process  by which precedent  is created.  It also  notes 
17.  Conversely,  if  the  simple  rule  were  preferable  to  the  complex  standard,  it  would 
make  a  difference  whether  the  benefit  arose  from  simplicity,  from  ex  ante formulation,  or 
from  both. 
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the  ways  in which  rules and standards may change  over  time,  and 
how  laws  regarding  form  (for  example,  formalities  required  in 
executing  a  will)  and background  laws  (for  example,  laws  provid- 
ing contract  remedies  when  parties do  not  specify  one)  may differ 
from  laws  regulating  harm-producing  behavior.  Part  V  offers  a 
brief conclusion. 
I.  Ex  ANTE  VERSUS  EX  POST  CREATION  OF  THE  LAW 
Section  A  offers  a  more  precise  statement,  embodied  in  a 
simple  illustration,  of  the  three  stages  described  in  the  Introduc- 
tion.  Section  B  analyzes  how  individuals might behave  under rules 
and standards, assessing costs  and benefits  for each possibility. Sec- 
tion  C  describes  how  the  analysis  differs  if  standards  are  trans- 
formed  into  rules  once  they  are  applied,  through  the  creation  of 
precedents.  Section  D  considers  the  fact  that both  individuals  and 
architects of  the  legal  system  may choose  how  much effort  will be 
devoted  to predicting or giving content  to legal commands.  Section 
E  comments  on  how  the  analysis  of  this  Part  suggests  that  the 
problem  of  creating  the  law  can  be  interpreted  as  one  involving 
the  government's  acquisition  and dissemination  of  information. 
A.  An  Illustration 
The  example  involves  three  stages,  as  described  in  the  Intro- 
duction.  (1)  The  law  is  promulgated-that  is,  the  government  de- 
cides  whether  conduct  will  be  governed  by  a  rule  or  a  standard. 
(2)  Individuals  make  their  choices.  Since  they  are  imperfectly 
informed,  they  first choose  whether  to  acquire  legal  advice  about 
the  rule  or  standard.  Next,  they  decide  how  to  behave.  (3)  The 
law  is  enforced-that  is,  the  rule  or  standard is  applied.  (A  brief 
formal presentation  of  the  example  appears in the  Appendix.) 
1.  Law  Promulgation.  The  government  enacts  a  law  to 
regulate  a  harm-causing  activity.  It  decides  whether  an  aspect  of 
the  law is to be promulgated  as a rule or as a standard. For exam- 
ple,  it  may  use  a  rule  to  specify  the  level  of  damages  to  be 
awarded for  a given  harm, a standard of  care,  a list of  prohibited 
acts, or  the  criteria an adjudicator should  consider  in making such 
determinations  ex post.  Alternatively,  it may use  a standard, there- 
by  leaving  any  or  all  of  such  decisions  for  the  enforcement  au- 
thority. 
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The problem is that the ideal content of the law with respect 
to these issues is not immediately apparent.18  Rather, some inves- 
tigation and deliberation is required.  It may be necessary to under- 
take an empirical analysis of the effect of a toxic chemical or to 
have some appropriate  group deliberate about values (for example, 
how to  value an invasion of privacy). To simplify the discussion, 
Sections A  through C focus on the situation in which there is a 
given cost of  determining the appropriate content of  the  law ex 
ante. Because of this cost, rules are more expensive to promulgate 
than standards.19 
2.  Choices  of  Individuals.  Individuals  are  uncertain  of  the 
actual content of  the law.2 That is, they only have estimates of 
the content of a rule or of the content an enforcement authority 
would give to  a standard. They may, however, acquire legal ad- 
vice-whether  from lawyers, through self-study, or by other means. 
Because a standard requires a prediction of how an enforcement 
authority will decide questions that are already answered in  the 
case of a rule, advice about a standard is more costly.21  Individu- 
als can pursue one  of  two  strategies. They can act based upon 
their best guess of the content of the law, or they can acquire ad- 
vice and act based upon how the law actually would apply to their 
contemplated conduct.2 
18.  If  it  were, the issues addressed in  this Article are of  little significance, as the 
costs of  promulgating  and applying the law would be  minimal. See infra Section III(A) 
(similarity  of transparent  standards  to rules whose content is the same). 
19.  The analysis considers the case of a single jurisdiction.  If another jurisdiction  has 
already invested in promulgating  a rule, which can simply be copied, there may be little 
additional cost in rules promulgation.  Thus, jurisdictions  might underinvest  in (or delay) 
promulgation,  attempting to  free-ride on  the investments of  other jurisdictions.  Projects 
designed to create model laws could mitigate this problem. 
20.  If individuals  already know the content of the law, the situation is equivalent to 
one in which legal advice is costless. The analysis  of subsection  B(2) would be applicable 
(ignoring the advice cost differential).  The possibility of  transparent  standards,  see infra 
Section III(A), is essentially one involving  costless advice. 
21.  See, e.g., POSNER,  supra note 1, at 44 45. The possibility that standards  may be 
more accessible than rules is discussed in Section III(A). 
22.  The discussion considers the case in which there is  no  particular  bias in unin- 
formed individuals'  estimates and their guesses are unaffected by whether there is a rule 
or a standard.  (If one assumed,  for example, that individuals  made systematic  errors with 
standards  but not with rules, rules would appear better, but this advantage would have 
no obvious connection to the inherent features of rules and standards.)  This is related to 
the  supposition in subsection 3  that an enforcement authority will give a  standard the 
same content that would have been given to a rule ex ante. 
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3.  Law  Enforcement.  The  enforcement  authority determines 
the  sanction,  if  any,  that  applies  to  individuals'  conduct.23 This 
process  is costly,  with the  cost  being  greater  if a standard governs 
because  the  adjudication  will  also  require  giving  content  to  the 
standard.2 
It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  "appropriate"  content  is 
taken  to  be  the  same  ex  ante  and  ex  post,2  which  implies  that 
both  the  law promulgator (with  a rule)  and the  law enforcer  (with 
a  standard)  are  able  to  determine  the  appropriate  con- 
tent26-although  the  cost  need  not  be  the  same  when  incurred ex 
ante  or  ex  post.'  The  motivation  for  taking  this  view-an  often 
unrealistic  one  for  reasons  explored  later28-is  to  focus  on  certain 
inherent  features  of  ex  ante  versus  ex  post  creation  of  the  law. 
Obviously,  when  one  formulation  more  comports  with  underlying 
norms,  it  will  be  advantageous  on  that  account.  But,  as  will  be 
seen,  the nature of  any such advantage cannot be  assessed  without 
first understanding  the  pure  effects  of  ex  ante versus  ex post  cre- 
ation  of  the  law. Also,  as Section  D  emphasizes,  the features  of  ex 
ante versus  ex post  creation  explored  in Sections  B  and  C  will  be 
an important determinant  of  when  rules or standards are likely  to 
be given  content  more  in accord with underlying norms. 
23.  "Enforcement  authority"  can  be  thought  of  as  including  the  entire  process  by 
which  laws  are  enforced,  whether  by  private  lawsuits  or  government  prosecution.  Thus, 
the  costs  encompass  the  total  costs  of  this  process,  and  the  framework  applies  equally  to 
civil  and  criminal  cases  resolved  in  courts  (whether  by  judge  or  jury),  as  well  as  to  ad- 
ministrative  tribunals, arbitration, and  the  like.  See  also  infra  Sections  IV(A)-(B). 
24.  See  also  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1,  at  229-30  (noting  how  the  effort  under  rules 
tends  to  be  less  even  when  rules  are  presumptive  rather than  absolute). 
25.  Most  of  the  analysis  only  requires  that  enforcement  tribunals give  content  to  the 
standard  in  an  unbiased  manner.  See infra  note  124. The  potential  for  inconsistent  appli- 
cations  of  standards  is  discussed  in  Section  II(A).  The  possibility  of  changing  circum- 
stances  is  considered  in  Section  IV(C). 
26.  For  example,  one  might  imagine  that  the  same  sort  of  inquiry would  be  conduct- 
ed  relying  on  the  same  experts  or  wise  advisors.  Note  that  a  legislature  promulgating  a 
rule  could,  if  it  wished,  impanel  a jury of  lay  people  and  have  lawyers  present  arguments 
to  them,  if  it  wished  to  enact  popular  understandings  into  law.  Also,  it  could  leave  adju- 
dication  ex post  to  an  expert  panel  consisting  of  the  same  individuals  it  would  have  con- 
sulted  ex  ante  in  promulgating  a  rule.  See  infra Section  IV(A). 
27.  See  infra  Section  D. 
28.  See  infra  Section  D;  Parts  II-IV. 
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B.  Analysis 
The differences between rules and standards  in this illustration 
depend on whether individuals  will choose to acquire legal advice 
to guide their behavior. Individuals  acting in their self-interest will 
acquire such advice only  if  its  perceived value exceeds  its  per- 
ceived cost. 
To  determine the  value of  legal  advice to  individuals, it  is 
necessary to  compare how  individuals would fare  if  they  were 
uninformed with how they would fare if they were informed. Un- 
informed individuals act based on their best guess about how the 
law will apply to their contemplated  conduct. Informed individuals 
act based on actual knowledge of the law. Thus, informed individ- 
uals might be deterred from conduct they would have undertaken 
if  they  had remained uninformed,29  which can  occur when they 
learn that such conduct is illegal or subject to  a higher sanction 
than they otherwise would have expected. Or, informed individuals 
might choose  to  undertake acts they would have been  deterred 
from committing if they had remained uninformed.  Both possibili- 
ties are of value to individuals.  The value of advice, then, is sim- 
ply the value of each possibility weighted by the likelihood of its 
occurrence.30  Note that, in this example, the value of advice is the 
same under both rules and standards,  as uninformed  individuals  do 
not  believe that the mode of  formulation affects the substantive 
content of the law. In addition, informed individuals  are afforded 
the  same guidance under either formulation, because a  standard 
will be  given the  same content as  a  rule would have had, and 
advice about the content of each formulation  is equally good. 
How, then, does the presence of  a rule or a standard affect 
individuals' decisions whether to become informed? The value of 
advice is the same under both formulations,  but the cost of advice 
differs. In  particular, advice is  more  costly under a  standard.31 
29.  "Deterrence"  should  be  construed  broadly  here.  It  includes  changing  the  level  or 
type  of  an  activity  or  the  manner  in  which  an  activity  is  conducted. 
30.  Risk  aversion  is  ignored  to  simplify  the  exposition.  As  the  discussion  in  Section 
III(D)  suggests,  the  results  are  similar when  individuals  are  risk averse. 
If  individuals  are  mistaken  in  their  view  about  the  value  of  advice,  the  analysis  in 
this  Part  would  be  largely  unaffected.  Misestimates  of  the  value  of  advice  are  relevant 
primarily with  regard to  the  relationship  between  the  private  and  social  values  of  advice, 
noted  briefly  in  subsection  3  and  explored  further in  Section  III(C). 
31.  The  possibility  that  advice  is  more  costly  with  rules  is  explored  in  Section  III(A). 
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Thus, there are three cases to  consider:32  (1)  Individuals do  not 
become informed either under a rule or under a standard,  because 
the value of information  is less than the cost of advice under both 
a rule and a standard.  (2) Individuals  become informed both under 
a  rule and under a  standard, because the  value of  information 
exceeds the cost of advice under both a rule and a standard. (3) 
Individuals become informed under a rule but not under a stan- 
dard, because the cost of becoming informed is less under a rule 
than under a standard. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is useful to  state the 
criterion for  evaluation employed here.  The  social  objective is 
taken to be the maximization  of benefits net of costs. Benefits are 
the net gain to individuals  from their acts; costs include the harm 
caused by individuals'  acts and legal costs-the  costs of promulgat- 
ing the law, the costs of legal advice sought by individuals,  and the 
costs  of  enforcement proceedings.33  The  "appropriate"  content 
embodied in a rule or that will be given to a standard  by the en- 
forcement authority provides the basis for assessing the weight to 
be given the benefits and harms of individuals'  acts.34 
1.  Individuals Do  Not  Become  Informed Either Under a Rule 
or  Under a  Standard. Because  individuals do  not  become  in- 
formed under either formulation  of the law, information  costs are 
not incurred.  Moreover, uninformed  individuals'  behavior does not 
depend on whether a rule or standard  prevails, so the benefits and 
harms of  individuals' acts will be  the  same. Thus in  this case, 
whether a rule or standard  is preferable  will depend solely on the 
differences in promulgation  and enforcement  costs. 
The difference in promulgation  costs favors standards,  whereas 
that in enforcement costs favors rules. Which is greater depends 
on two factors. First, the cost differentials  at the promulgation  and 
enforcement stages need not be equal, for reasons to be explored 
32.  The  discussion  to  follow  will  proceed  as  though  a  single  case  would  apply  to  all 
individuals,  for  a  particular  law.  More  realistically,  because  individuals'  available  acts, 
opportunities  to  take  precautions,  knowledge  of  the  law,  and  information  costs  will  differ, 
each  case  might  be  relevant  for  some  individuals. 
33.  Discounting  for  the  passage  of  time  is  ignored.  A  higher  discount  rate  tends  to 
favor  standards, which  have  a  cost  advantage  at  the  first  stage  and  disadvantages  at  the 
second  and  third stages. 
34.  That  is,  no  independent  standard of  what  constitutes  good  law  is  imposed.  Rath- 
er,  taking  a  stipulated  set  of  objectives  the  law  should  embody,  the  analysis  asks  which 
formulation  best  implements  them,  taking  into  account  legal  costs. 
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in Section D.  (It is often useful to think of a benchmark case in 
which these differentials are the same, adjusting  the argument for 
cases in which they are not straightforward.) 
Second, one must take into account the frequency with which 
the  two  types of  costs will be  incurred. Promulgation costs  are 
incurred once.  In  contrast, enforcement costs  may  be  incurred 
repeatedly or never.35  On one hand, a law may apply to an activi- 
ty  that is  undertaken by many individuals:  some federal income 
tax provisions apply to millions of individuals  and billions of trans- 
actions.6 In such instances, rules tend to  be  preferable. Even  if 
the promulgation  cost differential  significantly  exceeds the enforce- 
ment cost differential in  applying standards, rules may be  much 
cheaper.37  On  the other hand, a  law-or,  as is  often relevant, a 
particular  component of a law, possibly a highly detailed one-may 
have a  small likelihood of  applying to  any activity; consider the 
example of myriad  unique accident scenarios.  Then, standards  tend 
to  be preferable. Even if they are extremely costly to  apply, the 
significant  likelihood that the particular  application  will never arise 
may make standards  much cheaper.38 
35.  The  frequency  with  which  enforcement  costs  are  incurred  may  itself  depend  on 
whether  there  is  a  rule  or  a  standard.  See  also  infra  note  41  (differing  behavior  under 
rules  and  standards,  as  in  case  3,  is  another  reason  the  frequency  of  enforcement  actions 
may  differ).  If  enforcement  costs  are  indeed  lower  under  rules,  plaintiffs  may  be  more 
likely  to  sue.  (Plaintiffs  also  may  have  greater  uncertainty  about  whether  they  have  a 
viable  case  under  standards, which  could  result  in  a  change  in  the  number  and  composi- 
tion  of  cases:  Some  meritorious  suits  may  not  be  brought  and  some  suits  that  will  fail 
might  be  brought.)  The  likelihood  of  litigation  rather  than  settlement  may  also  be  affect- 
ed.  Lower  litigation  costs  make  litigation  more  likely  under  rules,  but  the  greater  predict- 
ability  of  outcomes  makes  litigation  less  likely.  Some  of  these  complications  could  be 
reflected  in  the  measure  of  enforcement  costs  under  each  formulation.  (For  example,  if 
litigation  rather  than  settlement  is  more  likely  under  standards,  the  enforcement  costs 
under  standards  would  simply  be  greater.)  Factors  affecting  the  frequency  of  litigation 
will  affect  both  enforcement  costs  and  compliance.  (One  could  adjust  damage  awards  or 
other  aspects  of  the  law  to  take  this  into  account; for example,  if fewer  individuals  would 
sue  under  standards due  to  higher  litigation  costs,  one  could  have  a  more  generous  dam- 
ages  rule  or  less  stringent  proof  requirements.) 
36.  The  language  of  the  discussion  in  the  text  suggests  a  finite  number  of  repetitions, 
but  the  result  is  essentially  the  same  if  the  number  is  infinite-as  when  the  law  will 
apply  forever-and  there  is  a  sufficiently  high  discount  rate  on  future  costs  and  benefits. 
37.  This  argument  applies  when  the  first adjudication  does  not  create  a  precedent  for 
future  cases.  See  infra  Section  C. 
38.  This  is  in  accord  with  the  intuition  that  it  is  not  worth  providing  with  great  care 
in  advance  for  remote  contingencies.  See  also  infra  Section  III(B)  (difficulty  of  formulat- 
ing  some  laws  as  rules);  note  78  (unforeseen  contingencies  covered  in  standards  but  not 
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2.  Individuals  Become  Informed  both  Under a  Rule and  Un- 
der a Standard.  Informed individuals  behave in the same manner 
whether a  rule or  standard prevails, so  again the  benefits and 
harms from individuals'  acts will be the same. Thus in this case, 
whether a rule or standard  is preferable  will depend on the differ- 
ences in promulgation  and enforcement costs (as in case 1)-and 
also on the difference in the cost of advice. 
The difference in the cost of advice, which favors rules, paral- 
lels the difference in enforcement costs. The first factor concerns 
the magnitude of  the differential and how it compares with the 
other differentials.  The second involves frequency.  Few (if any) or 
many individuals may incur costs in becoming informed about a 
law to guide their conduct; the greater the number of individuals 
likely  to  become  informed, the  greater the  likelihood of  rules 
being preferable. 
Note  that the  number of  individuals who  incur the  cost  of 
legal advice may greatly exceed the number who are subject to 
complete enforcement proceedings.39  Some  individuals who  seek 
advice may choose not to commit acts subject to  liability; others 
may commit acts that do  not in fact cause harm (consider laws 
governing accidents);  others may not be sued or prosecuted despite 
their liability; and most lawsuits are settled. Thus, even when ad- 
vice is only moderately more costly under standards  and enforce- 
ment proceedings are rare, there will be contexts in which the fre- 
quency with which advice is  sought will  make  the  advice cost 
differential  decisive.40 
little  expenditure  on  enforcement). 
39.  Similarly,  even  if  no  enforcement  proceeding  would  ever  occur-and  thus  no 
adjudicator would  ever  have  to  apply  the  standard-the  standard might  suffer  a  substan- 
tial  cost  disadvantage. 
40.  A  qualification  is  that  the  cost  of  legal  advice  may  be  decreasing  over  time.  For 
example,  a lawyer who  has previously  rendered  advice  on  the  same  law would  be  able  to 
offer  advice  to  a  subsequent  client  more  cheaply.  More  generally,  if  a  law  governs  a sub- 
stantial  amount  of  behavior,  there  may  be  conferences  or  publications  through  which  in- 
formation  is  disseminated  among  lawyers  or  to  groups  of  clients.  Nonetheless,  it  still 
seems  plausible  that  the  total  costs  will  be  greater  as  the  number  of  acts  increases,  al- 
though  this  relationship  need  not  have  the  simple  linear  form  described  here  (in  which  a 
given  cost  of  advice  is  multiplied  by  the  number  of  individuals  who  acquire  advice). 
Related,  there  may  be  a  public  good  aspect  to  legal  advice.  Those  first  to  inquire 
about  a  problem,  if  billed  for  the  full  cost  of  researching  the  question,  will  pay  a  large 
amount,  much  of  the  benefit  of  which  will  flow  to  subsequent  clients  of  the  lawyer.  If 
this  occurred,  there  would  be  a  disincentive  to  acquire advice  initially.  One  way  law  firms 
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3.  Individuals Become  Informed  Under a Rule but Not  Under 
a Standard.  In this case, unlike the first two, the manner of for- 
mulation affects whether individuals acquire advice and how they 
behave. Thus, a  comparison of  rules and standards requires that 
one  consider all  components of  social  welfare. The  analysis of 
promulgation and enforcement costs is similar to  that in the first 
two  cases,41  so  the  discussion here  will  focus  on  the  remaining 
components. 
Under a  rule, but not under a standard, individuals acquire 
advice before they act. This is desirable in that behavior will be 
more in accord with legal norms,42  but undesirable in that an ad- 
might address this problem would be to bill the first client much less (writing off much 
of the time, or perhaps doing much of the research before the first client arrives, while 
attending conferences or reading material on legal developments)  and bill subsequent  cli- 
ents more (billing a flat amount for a type of advice, or charging  higher hourly rates for 
more knowledgeable  attorneys, to recover costs previously  incurred).  Competition among 
lawyers complicates  the story. (It may limit feasible pricing  schemes, and it also results in 
duplication  of effort.) To the extent a public good problem remains, government  subsidy 
of information  about the law might be appropriate.  See also infra Section E  (problem of 
choosing rules or standards  viewed as one involving government  acquisition  and dissemi- 
nation of information);  Section III(C) (discussing  possible divergences  between the private 
and social values of  legal advice). Of course, the government  does to some extent per- 
form such functions, as when publications  are made available for free or  sold at rates 
that do not reflect the cost of compiling the information  (but only printing  and distribu- 
tion costs). 
41.  There is, however, a complication  concerning  the enforcement  cost differential.  In 
cases 1 and 2, that differential  was weighted by the expected number of cases. Because 
individuals'  behavior was the same under a rule and a standard  in each case, the expect- 
ed number of enforcement proceedings  was the same. But see supra note 35 (suggesting 
that the difference in enforcement  costs and information  available to plaintiffs  may result 
in  a  different number of  enforcement proceedings). In  case 3,  however, the  expected 
number of cases may differ. Recall that informed individuals  may be deterred more or 
less from committing  acts subject to legal sanctions,  depending on what they learn. Thus, 
in some instances there might be more or fewer enforcement  actions under rules. (There 
would be more when uninformed  individuals  were deterred from committing  acts subject 
to  modest sanctions-more  modest than they anticipated-and  fewer when uninformed 
individuals  would have committed acts they would not have committed if they knew the 
actual legal consequences.) Thus, the weight to be given the frequency component with 
regard to enforcement costs may be higher or lower than otherwise. See also infra note 
117 (how sanctions should reflect enforcement  costs). 
42.  The view that advised individuals  will behave better than uninformed ones,  as 
evaluated by the law about which they receive advice, is commonplace,  but should not be 
accepted uncritically.  See infra Section III(C) (discussing  the private versus social value of 
legal advice). 
Another respect in which advised individuals  may behave more in accord with the 
law concerns the effects of uncertainty  under a negligence rule. See infra note 123 (dis- 576  DUKE  LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 42:557 
ditional  cost-the  cost  of  advice-is  incurred. In principle,  the  net 
could  favor  either  rules  or  standards.43  But  more  can  be  said.  We 
know  that  individuals  only  acquire  information  when  its  benefits 
exceed  its  costs.  Thus,  the  value  of  advice  to  individuals  exceeds 
its cost.  As  a result, rules would  be preferable  on  account  of these 
components  whenever  the  private  value  of  advice-which  takes 
into  account  both  the  benefit  from  the  act  itself  and  the  legal 
sanction  (if  any)  the  individual  expects  to  pay-equals  the  social 
value  of  advice. The  discussion in Section  III(C)  identifies  contexts 
in which this equation  of private and social  values  of  advice  holds, 
and others  in which it does  not.44 
To  enter  these  components  into  the  framework,  recall  that in 
case  2  the  advice  component  involves  multiplying  the  number  of 
individuals  who  would  seek  advice  by  the  differential  in  the  cost 
of  advice  under  rules  and standards. In  this case,  the  advice  com- 
ponent  instead  involves  multiplying the  number of  individuals who 
would  seek  advice  by  the  differential  between  the  social  value  of 
advice  and the  cost  of  advice under rules. 
*  *  * 
cussing  the  range  of  laws  that  should  be  seen  as  involving  a  negligence  rule  for  present 
purposes).  If,  for  example,  there  is  uncertainty  concerning  what  an  adjudicator  would 
deem  to  be  due  care,  there  may  be  a  tendency  for  individuals  to  take  care  that  is  exces- 
sive  relative  to  the  expected  due  care  requirement,  although  it  is  also  possible  that  indi- 
viduals  would  take  less  care  than  the  expected  due  care  requirement.  See,  e.g.,  STEVEN 
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF  ACCIDENT LAW  79-83,  93-97  (1987);  Richard 
Craswell  &  John  E.  Calfee,  Deterrence  and  Uncertain  Legal  Standards,  2  J.L.  ECON.  & 
ORGANIZATION  279  (1986).  The  existence  of  a  tendency  toward  excessive  care  depends, 
however,  on  how  the  causation  requirement  is  applied.  See  Marcel  Kahan,  Causation and 
Incentives  to  Take  Care  Under  the  Negligence  Rule,  18  J.  LEGAL  STUD.  427  (1989);  see 
also  infra note  125  (if  uncertainty  is  resolved  ex  ante  with  some  error, substituting  a  rule 
for  a  standard  may  make  error  more  predictable  and  thus  behavior  may  be  worse). 
43.  In  some  contexts,  it  might  be  imagined  that  individuals  are  simply  aware  of  the 
content  of  rules,  so  no  cost  is  incurred,  in  which  case  the  failure  to  become  perfectly 
informed  under  standards  implies  an  unambiguous  loss.  For  example,  the  preference  for 
rules  in  the  context  of  substantive  criminal  law  seems  to  reflect  the  view  that  rules  will 
be  known  but  standards  may  be  applied  in  ways  individuals  would  not  anticipate.  See, 
e.g.,  Jonathan  C.  Carlson,  The  Act  Requirement and  the  Foundations  of  the  Entrapment 
Defense,  73  VA.  L.  REV. 1011,  1024  (1987). 
44.  If  the  private  value  of  advice  is  less  than  its  social  value,  the  conclusion  that 
rules  are  preferable  with  regard  to  the  acquisition  of  advice  also  follows:  The  magnitude 
of  the  social  gain  with  regard to  these  components  would  be  even  greater  than  suggested 
by  private  valuations.  If  the  private  value  of  advice  exceeds  its  social  value,  the  conclu- 
sion  would  be  different  only  if  the  social  value  were  sufficiently  low  that  it  were  less 
than  the  cost  of  advice-which  is  possible. RULES  VERSUS STANDARDS 
In  summary, the  greater the  frequency with  which a  legal 
command will apply, the more desirable rules tend to be relative 
to  standards. This  result arises because promulgation costs  are 
borne only  once,  whereas efforts to  comply with  and action to 
enforce the law may occur rarely or often. Rules cost more to pro- 
mulgate; standards cost more to  enforce. With regard to  compli- 
ance, rules' benefits arise from two sources: Individuals  may spend 
less in  learning the content of  the law, and individuals may be- 
come better informed about rules than standards and thus better 
conform their behavior to the law. 
C.  Precedent 
There is  an additional aspect of  enforcement activity that is 
important  to the problem addressed in this Article: whether, under 
a  standard, the  enforcement authority's first adjudication consti- 
tutes a  precedent for future enforcement proceedings. Section B 
examined the case of no precedent, in which the standard  is totally 
unaltered by  enforcement proceedings.45  One  can  contrast  the 
case  in  which the  first enforcement proceeding essentially trans- 
forms the  standard into a  rule.46  That is, in subsequent enforce- 
ment proceedings, courts simply apply the precedent rather than 
engaging  in  an  inquiry  concerning  appropriate  legal  treat- 
ment-and  access to this precedent costs no more than if the law 
had been promulgated as a rule in the first place. Similarly, legal 
advisors find it equally costly to consult a precedent as to consult 
a  law initially promulgated as  a  rule, so  that the  costs of  legal 
advice under a rule and a standard are equal once the precedent 
is established.  ([he discussion  here  focuses  on polar  cases  for convenience.4) 
45.  One can imagine a jury verdict that has no formal precedential  value, is not evi- 
dence for future cases, and is not even accessible to  legal advisors when researching  a 
legal question. 
46.  See,  e.g.,  HART, supra note 1, at 129 ("Where the decisions of the court on such 
matters [regulated by  standards] are regarded as  precedents, their specification of  the 
variable standard  is very like the exercise of delegated rule-making  power by an adminis- 
trative body, though there are also obvious differences.");  POSNER,  supra note 9, ? 20.1, 
at 539 ("[A]n accumulation  of  precedents dealing with the same question may create a 
rule of  law having the  same force as  an explicit statutory rule."). For jurisprudential 
discussions  of precedents as rules, see  Larry Alexander, Constrained  by Precedent,  63 S. 
CAL. L.  REV. 1  (1989);  Schauer,  Precedent, supra  note  5. 
47.  It is straightforward  to adjust the analysis to account for intermediate  cases-for 
example, when precedents and laws initially promulgated  as rules are not equally accessi- 
ble, or when only some of the activity governed by a standard  is covered by the prece- 
577  1992] DUKE  LAW  JOURNAL 
When the first adjudication  does create a precedent, only the 
first enforcement proceeding and individuals'  actions that precede 
the  completion of  that first proceeding need  be  considered, as 
subsequent events are identical under both rules and standards. 
Each of  the  three cases from Section B  is  now briefly reexam- 
ined.48 
In  case  1,  in  which individuals do  not  acquire legal advice 
under either rules or standards,  the factor of repetition is removed. 
Because there will be only one enforcement proceeding in which 
costs  differ,  one  compares the  cost  differential for  one  pro- 
ceeding,49  which favors rules, with the cost differential in promul- 
gating the law, which favors standards.  (Observe, however, that the 
cost of an enforcement proceeding under a standard  may be high- 
er when the result will be a precedent than when it will not.50) 
In case 2, in which individuals  acquire legal advice under both 
rules and standards, the factor of  repetition is  removed for en- 
forcement proceedings. But repetition may still be  relevant with 
regard to individual behavior because many individuals  may need 
to acquire advice before the precedent is established. (Reasons for 
this were noted in subsection B(2) and will be explored further in 
subsection IV(B)(1).) 
Case 3 parallels the second. The factor of repetition remains 
present only for individual  behavior before the precedent is estab- 
lished. As in the case of no precedent, the differential here favor- 
ing  rules,  for  each  individual, consists of  the  value  of  advice 
(which reflects changes in behavior to comply with the law) minus 
the cost of advice under rules. 
In summary,  if the first adjudication  under a standard consti- 
tutes a precedent for future enforcement proceedings and thereby 
transforms  the standard into a rule, the differences between pro- 
dent.  See  infra subsection  IV(B)(1).  Such  intermediate  cases  are  believed  to  be  important. 
Thus,  arguments  that  civil  law  systems  are  superior  to  common  law  ones  or  that  favor 
codifications,  restatements,  and other  summaries of  precedent  are motivated  by differences 
between  the  accessibility  of  precedents  and  statutes  (or  other  compilations  of  the  law). 
See,  e.g.,  Gregory  E.  Maggs,  Reducing  the  Costs  of  Statutory Ambiguity:  Alternative Ap- 
proaches  and  the Federal  Courts Study  Committee, 29  HARV. J. ON  LEGIS. 123,  126  & n.8 
(1992). 
48.  The  presentation  in  the  Appendix  examines  each  case  with  and  without  prece- 
dent. 
49.  This,  however,  must  be  discounted  for  the  possibility  that  no  enforcement  pro- 
ceeding  would  ever  occur. 
50.  See  infra subsection  D(3). 
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mulgating the law as a rule and as a standard  are diminished. But 
they are not eliminated. Frequency will still be  an important di- 
mension. If acts subject to the law are unlikely to arise, the possi- 
bility of  saving the  costs of  giving content to  the  law tends to 
favor standards.  If acts will be frequent, there may be substantial 
costs in the interim under standards-costs  of advice or costs re- 
flected in behavior that does not comply with the law-that  are 
avoided under rules. 
D.  The Degree  of  Effort Devoted  to Rule  Creation, Legal Advice, 
and Enforcement 
The  discussion thus far has examined the situation in which 
the  promulgation of  a  rule entailed a  given additional cost  and 
resulted in  a  determination of  the  "appropriate"  content of  the 
law. Similarly,  both legal advice and enforcement under a standard 
involved a given additional cost and properly predicted or deter- 
mined the  law's content. Achieving complete and proper assess- 
ments is usually infeasible and, even if possible, unwise due to the 
cost involved. Rather, it generally would be sensible at each stage 
to determine how much additional cost to  incur as a function of 
the benefits that result. This Section reconsiders each stage of the 
analysis in light of  this consideration.51  It also emphasizes factors 
that may influence the relative costs of inquiry at different stages. 
1.  Law Promulgation.  Presumably,  efforts to determine the 
appropriate  content of the law are subject to diminishing  returns. 
Further investigation and greater deliberation are almost always 
possible, but after a point would yield little improvement in the 
quality of  the resulting law.52  The value of  effort in  designing a 
rule depends on the frequency of behavior subject to the rule, for 
reasons explained in Section B. If the rule will govern the conduct 
of many individuals,  most of whom will acquire advice about the 
51.  The  problem  of  the  optimal  degree  of  investment  in  promulgating  or  applying 
rules  or  in  seeking  legal  advice  has,  to  my  knowledge,  received  little  attention.  Most 
relevant is  LouIS  KAPLOW  &  STEVEN SHAVELL,  ACCURACY IN THE ASSESSMENT  OF 
DAMAGES  (Harvard  Law  School  Program  in  Law  and  Economics  Discussion  Paper  No. 
116,  1992).  This  problem  is  related  to  the  question  of  the  optimal  complexity  of  laws 
addressed  in  Section  II(C). 
52.  The  quality  of  the  law  can  be  understood  as  reflecting  how  closely  it  conforms 
to  underlying  norms  or  to  the  likelihood  with  which  it  conforms. 
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rule's content, it will be more important that the rule closely re- 
flect the law's underlying  norms. If the rule is unlikely to apply to 
many or any acts, or if individuals  would not bother to consult it 
before acting, relatively little should be spent designing it.53  Note 
that this result softens the disadvantage  of rules in such instances 
by reducing the promulgation  cost differential;  at the same time it 
reduces the benefit of rules with regard to inducing individuals  to 
behave in a socially optimal manner if the rules to which they will 
conform are less in accord with underlying  norms. 
2.  Choices  of  Individuals.  The  analysis  for  legal  advice  is 
similar. Because resources devoted to legal advice that determines 
the content of a rule or predicts the content of a standard  will be 
subject to  diminishing returns, individuals' decisions concerning 
legal advice involve questions of  degree, rather than the  all-or- 
nothing decision described in the example in Section B. 
Observe that when substantial expenditures will be  made in 
designing a rule because it will apply to many individuals'  conduct, 
the effort at the rule's promulgation  stage will probably be greater 
than the effort an individual would choose to  expend to  have a 
lawyer predict the  content of  a  standard, because the  individual 
would be concerned only with the single instance of his own con- 
duct. In  this case, one  might expect behavior to  conform more 
closely  to  underlying norms under rules  than  under standards 
(even if more might actually be spent on legal advice under stan- 
dards, due to the higher cost of prediction of standards  compared 
to  consultation of rules).54  Conversely, if little effort is to  be de- 
voted to designing a rule because it might never apply, an individ- 
ual subject to a standard might expend more effort (in predicting 
how the standard  will be given content) once the event has actual- 
ly arisen, suggesting better behavior under standards.55  Thus, con- 
53.  Of  course,  the  more  important  the  conduct  subject  to  the  law,  the  more  should 
be  spent  at  all  stages  for  any  given  degree  of  frequency. 
54.  The  possibility  that  standards  would  be  more  accessible  than  rules,  with  the  re- 
sult  that  behavior  conforms  better  under  standards, is  explored  in  Section  III(A). 
55.  These  arguments  abstract from  possible  differences  in  the  cost  of  designing  rules 
and  predicting  standards.  One  might  imagine,  for  example,  that  the  former  is  cheaper 
because  the  latter requires  prediction,  or  that  the  latter is  cheaper  because  one  need  only 
consider  a  single  set  of  facts  or  because  the  facts  are  known  to  the  individual  but  must 
be  investigated  by  the  government.  Regardless,  the  dimension  of  frequency  emphasized  in 
the  text  will  be  important  and  will  have  the  tendency  suggested.  See  also  supra  note  40 
(discussing  public  goods  aspect  of  legal  advice). 
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sidering variations in effort at this stage affects both the  advice 
cost differential and the assessment of  behavior under rules and 
standards. 
3.  Law Enforcement. Begin with the situation examined in 
Section B, in which the first application of a standard would not 
be  a precedent for future cases. Then, the degree of  effort that 
should be made in an enforcement proceeding to give content to a 
standard should reflect the  fact  that  the  determination will  be 
relevant to one case.5 Therefore, when a law applies to frequent 
conduct, less effort should be  devoted to  giving content to  stan- 
dards than when designing rules, suggesting  that rules will give rise 
to  behavior more in accord with underlying norms.57  Conversely, 
when acts governed by a law (or a particular  detail of a law) are 
unlikely to arise, more effort should be devoted to giving content 
to standards. 
A  number of  important qualifications  should be  emphasized. 
First, how much effort should be spent giving content to  a stan- 
dard ex post in an enforcement  proceeding depends importantly  on 
the  extent to  which individuals would expend effort ex  ante to 
predict how the standard would apply to their contemplated con- 
duct. For  example, if  individuals would spend  little  to  become 
informed, and thus would not be  in a position to  anticipate the 
actual content  an  adjudicator would  supply, efforts devoted  to 
more careful application of  a  standard would be  wasted.58  As  a 
56.  The  discussion  emphasizes  the  effort  that  should  be  made.  In  the  legal  systems 
of  the  United  States  and  some  other  countries,  the  effort  in court  adjudication  is  typically 
determined  by  a  combination  of  the  parties'  expenditures  on  the  case  (which  reflects  pri- 
vate  interests),  see  KAPLOW  &  SHAVELL,  supra  note  51,  the  overall  workload  of  the 
court,  whether  the  question  is  one  of  law  or  fact,  and,  with  questions  of  law,  the  degree 
to  which  the  judge(s)  find  the  matter  interesting  or  important.  Only  some  of  these  fac- 
tors  are  related  to  the  socially  appropriate  level  of  effort,  and  even  those  factors  may 
have  only  a  modest  connection. 
57.  Consider  Schauer's  suggestion  that  decisionmaking  without  rules  is  subject  to 
errors  arising  from  the  adjudicator's  lack  of  understanding.  See  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1, 
at  150.  This  view  will  be  correct  either  when  the  sorts  of  individuals  who  are 
decisionmakers  are  less  competent  (perhaps  because  less  expert)  than  those  who  design 
rules,  see  infra  Section  IV(A),  or,  as  emphasized  in  this  subsection,  when  the 
decisionmaking  environment  under  standards  involves  less  effort  being  applied. 
58.  If,  regardless  of  the  content  given  standards,  individuals  act  based  on  gross  es- 
timates,  an  adjudicator  might  as  well  base  its  decision  on  such  gross  estimates.  See 
KAPLOW  &  SHAVELL,  supra  note  51.  Some  elaboration  of  this  issue  appears  in  Section 
III(C).  See  also  infra Section  III(D)  (discussing  risk aversion). 
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related matter, if one wishes to induce individuals to become in- 
formed to some extent at the time they act, ex post expenditures 
will be  necessary to  ensure that an ex ante incentive to  become 
informed exists. The more precise the adjudicator  will be ex post, 
the more precise individuals  will be induced to become ex ante. In 
this context, the value of a more accurate  ex post adjudication  lies 
in its ex ante effect on behavior.59  Thus, the appropriate  degree of 
effort in  giving content to  standards will  reflect both  that one 
actual case is involved (not many cases and not the mere possi- 
bility of a case) and that effort counts for the one case not in the 
abstract but rather to  the extent it creates ex ante incentives for 
individuals  to adjust their conduct.60 
Second, the cost of inquiry  into the appropriate  content of the 
law need not be  the same at the promulgation  and enforcement 
stages. Most obviously, inquiry may be cheaper in an enforcement 
proceeding because only one set of facts need be considered,61  or 
because the act itself provides information.62  These factors would 
often be most important  precisely when standards  are more likely 
to  be  preferable generally-when  acts governed by  a  law vary 
greatly in relevant characteristics,  and each is unlikely to  occur.63 
59.  See also Section III(E) (discussing  objectives  of the law other than the control of 
behavior  ex  ante). 
60.  In  a  single case, there is, of  course, no  ex ante effect on  the  actor's conduct 
from the actual ex post decision concerning  effort in applying  the standard.  More broadly, 
however, the  legal system will become known-to  some extent generally and to  some 
extent with regard  to particular  laws-for  the degree to which it supplies  content to stan- 
dards in enforcement proceedings.  The discussion in the text proceeds as though actual 
practice over time will determine perceptions.  (To the extent that there are divergences, 
the effect on the analysis  would be straightforward.) 
61.  For example, if  a  driver's speed was 100 miles per hour, one  need not decide 
whether the ideal speed limit is 55 or 60 miles per hour. 
62.  See, e.g., infra note 78  (concerning events difficult to  foresee); Section III(B). 
With technological uncertainty,  the very fact of  an accident or a  pattern of  harm may 
provide information  that did not exist before the  act was taken. (It  need not provide 
such information:  A  substance may have been previously suspected to  be carcinogenic, 
and the available  tests may be no more reliable than previously.)  Note that both of these 
factors seem  more plausible with regard to  fact scenarios than with regard to  which 
norms are appropriate-that is, for example, whether only safety and time or also energy 
conservation  should be considered  in designing  laws governing  driving. 
63.  Of course, there may be acts that will arise frequently  in the future about which 
little is known, as when there is a technological  advance. When future frequency  corre- 
sponds with past frequency,  however, there will usually be substantial  information  avail- 
able that can be consulted when designing a  rule. Even when acts are new, if  latency 
periods are not  long, a  rule designer might conduct tests to  determine previously un- 
known effects. This would tend to  be  desirable if  many such acts are expected to  be RULES  VERSUS STANDARDS 
Note,  however, that the lower cost of inquiry in applying a stan- 
dard does  not imply that the standard should always be  applied 
more carefully on that account. If the application will govern only 
the single case or if it could not have been anticipated at the time 
the  individual decided to  act (perhaps because the consequences 
were not  apparent until afterward),6 there would be  little value 
in using the newly available information, even if incorporating  it 
into  a  decision is  cheap. Also,  in  some  cases  inquiry may  be 
cheaper when designing rules than when applying standards, due 
to economies of scale with regard to the former.65 
Finally, consider the  situation in  which the  application of  a 
standard  will produce a precedent. Then, the appropriate  degree of 
effort in giving content to the standard  at the enforcement stage is 
determined in much the same manner as for a rule at the promul- 
gation stage.66  Thus, whether a  decision will  constitute a  prece- 
dent affects the degree of effort an adjudicator  should expend in 
giving content to  a  standard. Also,  note  that this analysis bears 
upon when the creation of  precedent is appropriate. If an initial 
decision to promulgate a law as a standard  rather than as a rule is 
an appropriate  judgment based on the relevant costs and benefits, 
rather than, say, a legislature's  decision to delegate the question to 
the courts,67  converting a standard to  a rule via precedent would 
be  sensible only  if  assessments of  the  relevant factors differed. 
These  assessments might differ if,  for  example, the  adjudicator 
committed in the future. This may be one of many reasons that drug regulation requires 
tests prior to approval. 
64.  In contrast, if the facts that could not be  readily or cheaply anticipated by the 
promulgator  of  a  law are readily apparent to  the actor, it  is  desirable that individuals 
anticipate that an adjudicator  will take these facts into account. See Steven Shavell, Lia- 
bility  and  the  Incentive  to  Obtain  Information  About  Risk,  21  J.  LEGAL STUD.  259, 
263-66 (1992). 
65.  See  infra note  101. 
66.  A  difference is that it is known with a standard  that the case has arisen at least 
once. In addition, there are the differences noted previously  concerning  the cost of  pro- 
mulgation.  Yet if the precedent will be confined to particular  facts (for example, driving 
at 100 miles per hour is declared illegal without comment on driving 90 miles per hour), 
the precedent will be narrower  than a rule (for example, one that sets the speed limit at 
55 miles per hour)-in  which case not as much effort would be appropriate  (because the 
frequency with which the precedent will apply is lower). Presumably,  this is relevant to 
courts' inclination,  discussed in subsection IV(B)(1), to  decide cases narrowly;  they may 
have good information  generated by the case with regard to  the situation before them, 
but may have little information  regarding  other cases. 
67.  See  infra Section  IV(A);  subsection  IV(B)(1). 
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learns that a particular  incident has indeed arisen and so might be 
able to  assess the  incident at  lower cost than would have been 
possible  ex ante.6 
*  *  * 
The  foregoing considerations suggest that  appropriately de- 
signed rules and standards  will be imperfect and that individuals' 
behavior will imperfectly  reflect the content of the law.69  The pre- 
ceding discussion casts further light on  how imperfect rules and 
standards  would be, the circumstances  in which individual  behavior 
will be better under one formulation  or the other, and the magni- 
tude of the cost differentials  with regard to promulgating  the law, 
obtaining legal advice, and enforcing the law. 
This  discussion speaks largely in  an  all-or-nothing manner: 
Should the law be promulgated  as a rule or a standard, and how 
carefully  designed and applied should either one be? Similar  analy- 
sis applies to the question of how many factors should be included 
in a rule or a standard,  as will be noted in the discussion of sim- 
plicity versus complexity in  Part II.  As  a  related matter, some 
aspects of  a  law-those  likely to  apply to  many acts-are  best 
included in  a  rule, whereas others-those  unlikely to  apply-are 
best  left  to  a standard.70 
68.  Related,  accumulated  experience  may change  estimates  of  frequency  or  other  fac- 
tors.  See  infra  note  160.  Otherwise,  as  when  the  conduct  subject  to  the  law  is  frequent 
and  the  costs  of  determining  the  appropriate content  of  the  law are  unchanged,  precedent 
is  necessarily  inferior  for  the  reasons  noted  in  Section  C:  In  the  interim,  costs  spent  on 
legal  advice  may  be  higher,  and  conformity  may  be  lower.  See  infra subsection  IV(B)(1). 
Therefore,  when  events  or  technological  changes  decrease  the  costs  of  designing  the  law, 
it  may  be  better  to  promulgate  a  rule  at  that  time  than  to  wait  for  a  precedent  reflect- 
ing  the  new  information  to  be  established. 
69.  As  examined  in  Part  II,  commentators  frequently  note  that  the  costs  of  ex  ante 
rule  creation  may  be  great,  with  the  result  that  imperfect,  over-  and  underinclusive  rules 
will  be  promulgated.  Yet  they  assume  that  ex post  it  will  be  optimal  to  be  more  precise 
(even  perfectly  precise).  (Compare  the  discussion  in  Section  II(D)  of  whether  rules  or 
standards  tend  to  be  more  detailed  in  operation.)  In  the  absence  of  the  sorts  of  factors 
discussed  above,  however,  this  result  can  arise  only  if  the  legal  system  inefficiently  ex- 
pends  more  ex  post  in  making  single  applications  of  standards  than  it  would  expend  ex 
ante  in  designing  a  rule  that  may  be  applicable  to  the  behavior  of  many.  If  the  system 
actually  operates  this  way  when  it  should  not,  standards  are  worse  in  operation  than  in 
principle.  The  additional  accuracy  ex  post-which  may  not  even  be  particularly valuable 
in  governing  behavior  ex  ante-is  by  assumption  more  costly  than  it  is  appropriate. 
70.  See  infra Section  III(B). 
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E.  Creation of  the  Law  as  Information  Acquisition  and  Dissemi- 
nation 
The  analysis of  this Part suggests that the  problem of  pro- 
mulgating and applying rules and standards  can be understood as 
one  involving the  government's acquisition and dissemination of 
information about the appropriate  content of the law.71  Whether a 
law should be given content ex ante or ex post involves determin- 
ing whether information should be gathered and processed before 
or after individuals  act.72 
When the government promulgates  a rule, it gathers informa- 
tion before individuals act and announces its findings.73  As  a re- 
sult,  the  information is  available to  individuals when  they  act; 
individuals then may be guided by it and spared the expense of 
producing such information themselves.74  In addition, the informa- 
tion is available to adjudicators,  who realize similar advantages. 
Whether the ideal time to acquire and disseminate information 
is ex ante or ex post depends, most importantly,  on the frequency 
with which the information  will be used. The savings from a single 
ex ante investigation will be great when the use of the results will 
be frequent, but will be negligible when the use of the results will 
be  unlikely. Also,  to  the extent there are economies of  scale in 
information acquisition, ex  ante  wholesale  investments may  be 
superior.75  But if there are advantages in delay because informa- 
tion will be easier to acquire at the time individuals act or cases 
71.  See also infra note 196 (suggesting that government's  choice between rules and 
standards  may be illuminated  by considering  how complex private organizations  formulate 
internal operating procedures).  The term "information"  is used here to include anything 
relevant to  reaching a  better decision, whether facts or understandings  that can be  im- 
proved through greater discussion  and reflection. 
72.  Similarly,  the question of how much effort to devote to rule-creation  and to giv- 
ing content to standards  in enforcement  proceedings  involves determining  the appropriate 
investment in information. 
73.  Whether the form of the announcement  is legally binding in all of its particulars 
or is merely suggestive may be less important  than whether the information  is gathered 
and published.  See supra note 5 (discussing  whether binding rules are possible); infra Sec- 
tion III(B) (de-emphasizing  the language  of the law); subsection  IV(B)(3) (noting that the 
government's  conducting  and publishing  of a study on hazardous  substances  may have an 
effect similar to the adoption of a rule embodying  the study's results). 
74.  See also supra note 40 (discussing  public goods problem in private production  of 
such information). 
75.  See  infra note  101. 
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are  adjudicated,  ex  post  investments  would  tend  to  be  prefera- 
ble.76 
II.  RULES VERSUS STANDARDS AND  COMPLEXITY: 
ON  OVER-  AND  UNDERINCLUSIVENESS 
This  Part  attempts  to  clarify  understanding  of  the  view  that 
rules tend to be over- and underinclusive relative to standards, and 
more  generally,  the notion  that differences  between  rules and stan- 
dards typically involve  differences  of  substance  as well  as of  form. 
Section  A  offers  a  vocabulary  for  addressing  this  issue,  one  that 
allows the complexity  of  a legal command and the time  at which it 
is  given  content  (ex  ante versus  ex post)  to  be  distinguished  con- 
ceptually.  Section  B  explains  why  this  distinction  is  important. 
Section  C  briefly  discusses  how  complexity  ought  to  be  analyzed. 
Section  D  concludes  by commenting  on  whether  there  are reasons 
to  expect  standards to  be  applied  in  a systematically  more  or  less 
detailed  manner than rules. 
A.  Distinguishing  Complexity from  the Choice Between Rules and 
Standards: Definitions 
It  is useful  to  have  a way  to  determine  when  rules  and  stan- 
dards  have  the  same  content  and  thus  the  same  degree  of  com- 
plexity.  The  following  construction  permits  this. For  any standard, 
consider  the  actual  outcomes  that  would  arise  for  all  possible 
cases.  Now,  define  the  "rule equivalent  to  the  standard" (or  the 
"de facto  standard")  as  that  rule  which  attaches  these  same  out- 
comes  to  these  cases.77 Thus,  if  a  standard  is  compared  to  the 
rule equivalent  to  the  standard, the content  and level  of  detail  are 
held  constant.  (For  example,  using the  illustration in the  Introduc- 
tion,  a standard that  on  its face  admitted  dozens  of  factors but  in 
practice involved  only two would be compared to a rule containing 
only  those  two factors.) 
Note  that nothing  has  been  said  about  the  practicality of  the 
rule that would  be  equivalent  to  the  standard, because  it is merely 
76.  See  supra  subsection  D(3). 
77.  One  could  also  operate  in  the  reverse  direction  and  inquire  into  the  "standard 
equivalent  to  the  rule." Thus,  as  with  the  example  in  Part  I,  for  a  given  rule  one  could 
imagine  a  standard  that  must  be  applied  with  the  same  level  of  detail,  with  the  content 
of  the  standard  to  be  determined  by  the  same  sort  of  investigation  that  determined  the 
content  of  the  rule. 
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an analytical construct that will demonstrate its usefulness in the 
discussion  to  follow.78 One  problem  deserves  brief  attention: 
There  may  be  inconsistency under a  standard79-as one  might 
expect, for  example, when decision is  by  general jury verdict.80 
This could involve occasional aberrations or situations in  which, 
say, a standard  yielded one result half of the time and a different 
result the rest of the time.81  Even for this extreme case, there ex- 
78.  One might object that the rule equivalent to the standard  would be  impossible, 
because not every contingency  can be anticipated.  See  SCHAUER,  supra  note 1, at 83-84 
(discussing the possibility that a rule might incorporate  all relevant distinctions  but still 
be  vulnerable to  the problem of  unanticipated  events). Because this construct is  hypo- 
thetical to begin with, this is not decisive for the main argument  that follows. (To estab- 
lish it, one need not actually write what the rule equivalent to the standard  would be.) 
Moreover, one can think of cases in which contingencies  cannot be foreseen as those in 
which design of the relevant components  of the rule would be prohibitively  costly, rather 
than "impossible."  Section I(D)  examines the question of  how much should be invested 
in  designing rules. It  is  apparent that sufficiently remote contingencies that cannot be 
addressed except at high cost should not be included in rules in any event. If, as a re- 
sult, the  best rule would be  less detailed than the  rule equivalent to  some particular 
standard,  a comparison  of the rule to the posited standard  would require consideration  of 
both differences in the level of detail (complexity) and differences between ex ante and 
ex post creation. This is precisely the sort of analysis advocated in the remainder  of this 
Part. And, to  be more concrete, such analysis suggests that the likelihood of  important 
contingencies whose relevant contours cannot readily be  anticipated when promulgating 
the law (but which would be understood  by the time individuals  subject to  the law de- 
cide how to  act) is  a  factor favoring the  (implicitly) complex standard.  Thus, there is 
nothing in the analytical  construct  offered in the text that is inconsistent  with this some- 
times important possibility. See  also  infra Section III(B)  (concerning the  difficulty of 
formulating  some laws as rules). 
There is  also no  necessary contradiction  between this construct and the view that 
rules "are necessarily general rather than particular."  Schauer, supra note  4,  at  647, 
649-51. Particularity  is a matter of degree. Given the limits of language and a finite text, 
no feasible rule could ever be infinitely  particular.  Still, for all cases that might arise, one 
could in principle note the outcome and imagine the rule that stipulated such an out- 
come given all the particulars  of the case. Moreover, as emphasized  in this Part and in 
Section I(D), in practice standards  will not and should not be applied in a manner that 
accounts for all conceivably  relevant particulars. 
79.  There will be some inconsistency  in practice under a rule as well, although gen- 
erally less. 
80.  Other decisionmakers  also can be quite inconsistent.  For example, in a study of 
sentencing by district  court judges in the Second Circuit,  judges awarded  widely disparate 
sentences  in  identical  hypothetical  cases.  See  ANTHONY PARTRIDGE &  WILLIAM B. 
ELDRIDGE,  THE SECOND  CIRCUIT  SENTENCING  STUDY 5-11  (1974). 
81.  Such inconsistencies  might reflect differences  in the individual  jurors selected, the 
parties' lawyers,  or any number of other factors. One could specify these features of each 
case and simply make them part of the "rule equivalent to the standard."  If the feature 
was normatively  relevant, this would be appropriate.  If not, presumably  the simpler rule 
that ignored the factor would be  superior on  grounds of  both its content and its sim- 
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ists  an  equivalent  rule-a  rule  that  specifies  the  two  results  as 
possibilities,  with  the  actual result to  be  determined  by the  flip  of 
a coin. Thus, the problem  of  inconsistency  does  not undermine  the 
conceptual  construction, which allows one  to consider the desirabil- 
ity  of  ex ante versus  ex post  creation  of  the  law, holding  the  con- 
tent  of  the  law  constant.  (Needless  to  say,  in  most  contexts  the 
randomized  rule equivalent  to  the  standard would  be  inferior to  a 
rule  that  selected  one  of  the  two  outcomes  for  all  cases,  or  to  a 
single,  consistent  compromise  between  the  two  outcomes.82 Such  a 
deterministic  rule,  in  turn, would  be  superior  to  the  hypothesized 
standard in this regard.) 
B.  Distinguishing  Complexity from  the Choice Between Rules and 
Standards: Implications 
Using  the construct of the rule equivalent  to the standard, one 
can  compare  rules  and standards of  differing content  (as  they  are 
applied)  in  two  steps.  First,  one  can  compare  the  standard  to  an 
equivalent  rule,  using  the  analysis  of  Part  I.83 Second,  one  can 
compare  this  equivalent  rule  to  the  rule  under  consideration  by 
analyzing  their  differences  in  details.  (Alternatively,  one  could 
compare  the  rule to  an equivalent  standard and then  compare  this 
equivalent  standard to  the  standard under consideration.) 
Many  discussions  of  rules  versus  standards combine-or  con- 
fuse-these  two  concerns.  In  particular,  simple  rules  are  often 
82.  Consistency  might  be  favored  by  considerations  of  risk  aversion,  fairness,  or  un- 
certainty  that  makes  settlement  before  trial  more  difficult.  The  last  reason  is  noted  in 
Ehrlich  &  Posner,  supra note  1,  at  265. 
83.  The  discussion  of  rules  and  standards  in  Part  I  focuses  exclusively  on  the  ques- 
tion  of  whether  content  is  determined  ex  ante  or  ex post.  Nothing  depended  on  whether 
the  comparison  involved  a  simple  rule  and  a  simple  standard  or  a  complex  rule  and  a 
complex  standard.  The  analysis  assumed  only  that  the  content,  and  thus  level  of  detail, 
were  held  constant.  For  example,  it  may  be  that  with  a  complex  rule,  the  government 
must  promulgate  (stage  one),  a  lawyer  must  consult  (stage  two),  and  a  tribunal  must 
apply  (stage  three)  a  detailed  web  of  provisions,  rather  than,  say,  a  simple  statement  of 
whether  an  act  is  prohibited.  Likewise,  with  a  complex  standard,  a  web  must  be  devel- 
oped  and  applied  ex  post  (stage  three)  and  anticipated  by  lawyers  (stage  two).  Presum- 
ably,  each  of  these  processes  will  involve  a  greater  cost  than  with  a  simple  rule  or  stan- 
dard.  Nonetheless,  the  relevant  analysis  would  be  the  same.  Of  course,  for  a  standard 
and  corresponding  rule,  it  may  be  that  some  details  would  better  be  promulgated  in  a 
rule  and  others  left  to  an  adjudicator using  the  formulation  of  a  standard, rather than  all 
being  crafted  in  one  mode,  particularly because  some  details  will  concern  frequently  con- 
ducted  activities  and  others  infrequently  occurring ones.  See supra note  6  and  accompany- 
ing  text;  infra Section  III(B). 
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compared to complex standards;  most commonly, it is asserted that 
rules  tend  to  be  over-  and/or underinclusive relative  to  stan- 
dards.8 The reason for this suggested difference is that rules limit 
the range of permissible considerations  whereas standards do not. 
Observe, however, that a rule cannot be  over- or underinclusive 
relative to a standard  if one is comparing  the standard  to the rule 
equivalent to  the  standard. Implicitly, therefore, commentators 
must be comparing  a complex standard  to a simple rule-that  is, a 
rule simpler than the rule equivalent to  the standard. Section D 
explores whether rule systems are indeed universally  simpler than 
standards, as each formulation actually would be created and ap- 
plied in practice. The focus here is on how one  should compare 
rules and standards  that indeed differ in complexity. 
Whether a  complex standard is  preferable to  a  simple rule 
depends on the combined effects of complexity and promulgation 
of the law as a rule versus as a standard (ex ante versus ex post 
creation). When a complex standard is said to be preferable to a 
simple rule, it may be that complexity and use of a standard are 
both independently and unambiguously  desirable.85  But there are 
two additional possibilities. 
First, it  may be  that a  simple standard (one  equivalent in 
content  to  the  simple  rule  under consideration) is  undesirable 
compared to the simple rule, whereas a complex standard  is desir- 
able. This suggests that the  desirability of  the  complex standard 
arises from its complexity,  not from its promulgation  as a standard. 
In this case, a complex rule may8 be even better than the com- 
84.  See  sources  cited  supra  note  13. The  tendency  to  make  this  comparison  has  been 
noted  in  Schlag,  supra  note  5,  at  423.  Colin  Diver  indicates  the  possibility  that  a  stan- 
dard  "may  be  under-  or  overinclusive  in  application,  because  its  vagueness  invites  misin- 
terpretation."  Diver,  supra  note  1,  at  73.  This  possibility  may  refer  to  the  problem  of  in- 
consistency,  discussed  in  Section  A.  To  assume  that  this  is  the  only  manner  in  which  a 
vague  standard  may  be  over-  or  underinclusive,  however,  is  misleading.  As  Diver  notes, 
see  id.  at  69,  an  open-ended  standard may  be  interpreted  in  a  simple  manner.  This,  how- 
ever,  would  be  a  "misinterpretation" only  if  it  indeed  were  optimal  to  give  it  more  pre- 
cise  content  in  practice.  As  the  discussion  in  Section  C  indicates,  this  need  not  be  the 
case. 
85.  Similarly, if  the  simple  rule  is  preferable,  it  may  be  that  simplicity  and  use  of  a 
rule  are  both  desirable,  or  that  only  one  dimension  favors  formulation  as  a  simple  rule. 
86.  This  need  not  be  the  case,  however,  because  of  synergy.  For  example,  designing 
the  complex  rule  may  be  expensive  and  the  likelihood  of  application  for  each  of  the 
detailed  components  may  be  sufficiently  small  that  a  complex  standard  is  better,  whereas 
the  analogous  balance  is  otherwise  for  the  simple  rule  and  simple  standard-because  the 
provisions  would  be  rather general,  applying  to  many  actors. 
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plex  standard.8 Thus,  requirements for  handling different haz- 
ardous substances might better be  promulgated as complex stan- 
dards than as  simple rules, which ignored important differences 
among substances, but complex rules may be best of all (as noted 
in the example in the Introduction). 
Second, it may be that a complex rule is undesirable, but a 
complex standard desirable. This suggests that the desirability of 
the complex standard arises from its promulgation  as a standard, 
not its complexity. In this case, a simple standard-meaning one 
that in  practice is  applied using little  detail-should  be  consid- 
ered.88 For  example,  whether  an  exception  to  a  town's  re- 
quirement that people  keep  off  the  grass in  the  public square 
should be made in the event that the President unexpectedly  visits, 
might best be left to a standard,  because the event is so unlikely 
to arise. Thus, a simple standard  that considers only a few salient 
factors might be preferable,  since the expectation that an adjudica- 
tor would take into account myriad  subtle factors ex post would be 
unlikely to affect the crowd's behavior in any event. 
C.  Analyzing  the Problem of  Over- and  Underinclusiveness 
Comparing  the desirability  of  a complex standard that is ac- 
cordingly costly to apply with a rule that is sometimes over- and 
underinclusive  because of its simplicity raises two separate issues: 
rules versus standards  (ex ante versus ex post creation of the law), 
already examined in Part I; and the  appropriate level  of  detail, 
which requires a separate analysis. In order to compare two rules 
(or two standards) having different levels of  detail, one  needs a 
framework  for analyzing  the effects of detail in laws. Because this 
problem is not the primary  focus of this Article and because it has 
87.  Unlike  most  other  commentators,  Colin  Diver  notes  that  when  over-  and 
underinclusion  is  an  important problem,  it  is  optimal  to  employ  either  highly  flexible  for- 
mulas  (complex  standards) or  intricate regulatory formulas  (complex  rules).  See Diver,  su- 
pra  note  1,  at 74-75. 
88.  Again,  because  of  synergy,  this  implication  need  not  follow.  Thus,  when  there  are 
many  possibilities,  each  unlikely  to  arise,  a  complex  rule  may  be  too  expensive  because 
of  promulgation  costs  and  a  simple  standard  may  be  of  only  modest  benefit  because  it 
does  not  respond  to  the  range  of  possibilities,  whereas  a complex  standard would  be  best 
of  all. 
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received attention in other work,89  only a brief summary of basic 
principles is offered here. 
To  illustrate, consider what  law  should be  promulgated to 
regulate a given set of activities-for  example, the discharge of a 
certain class of  chemicals. Most of  the chemicals cause a  known 
level of harm; the remainder  of the chemicals are harmless. But it 
is not immediately apparent which of the chemicals are the harm- 
ful ones. 
Compare two laws. A simple rule holds individuals  discharging 
any of the chemicals in this class strictly liable for damages equal 
to the average harm (that is, the harm multiplied by the fraction 
of  discharged chemicals that are  harmful). A  complex standard 
holds individuals "appropriately"  responsible: An  adjudicator  will 
conduct an inquiry, the result being that those discharging  chemi- 
cals that are actually harmful  will be held strictly liable for damag- 
es equal to the level of harm caused, and those discharging  harm- 
less chemicals will not be held liable. Thus, the standard  makes an 
ex post, case-by-case  determination  of which chemicals are harmful. 
The standard is complex compared to  the rule, because the rule 
does not distinguish  among chemicals in this class. 
Observe that the simple rule is both over- and underinclusive 
compared  to  the  more  complex  standard.  The  simple  rule 
overdeters discharges  of harmless chemicals covered by the law by 
subjecting them to positive liability. Some harmless discharges will 
therefore be  deterred despite their desirability. The  simple rule 
underdeters discharges  of harmful  chemicals covered by the law by 
subjecting them  to  liability for  less  than the  actual harm they 
cause. Some harmful discharges will be  made even  though their 
benefit is less than the harm they cause. 
To determine whether the simple rule or complex standard is 
superior, consider the differences in costs and behavior under the 
two laws. At  the promulgation  stage, there would be little differ- 
ence. Although a rule is more costly to  promulgate than a stan- 
dard of  the same  degree of  complexity, this rule is simple.  There  is 
no  ex  ante investigation to  define  which of  the  chemicals are 
harmful. 
89.  See  Louis  KAPLOW,  A  MODEL OF THE OPTIMAL  COMPLEXITY  OF RULES (Har- 
vard  Program  in  Law  and  Economics  Discussion  Paper  No.  97,  1991).  The  analysis  in 
that  piece  does  not  consider  promulgation  costs,  although  incorporating  them  would  be 
straightforward. 
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At  the  stage concerned with individuals' behavior, one  can 
identify two possibilities (or, two sets of individuals).  First, individ- 
uals may not become informed with respect to the complex stan- 
dard, because of  the  cost  of  determining whether the  chemical 
they would discharge is  harmful.90  Suppose that they know only 
that the  chemical they contemplate discharging  is subject to  the 
standard, which implies an expected liability equal to the average 
harm (which is precisely how they expect to be treated under the 
simple rule). In this instance, their behavior will be the same un- 
der both formulations  of the law. At the enforcement stage, apply- 
ing the complex standard will be more costly. But this will be a 
waste, because behavior will not be  improved by avoiding over- 
and underinclusiveness.  As a result, the simple rule would be supe- 
rior. Achieving a better fit between the law and behavior is  ac- 
complished only if individuals  are induced to conform their behav- 
ior to the legal norm.91 
Second, consider individuals who  do  become informed with 
respect to the complex standard.  They expend resources on advice 
and, upon learning whether their chemical is indeed harmful, may 
be induced (depending on what they learn) to behave differently. 
Suppose that this change in behavior is desirable, even when tak- 
ing  into  account the  cost  of  advice.92  Then, with regard to  the 
second stage, at which individuals'  decisions are made, the com- 
plex  standard will  be  superior to  the  simple rule.93  At  the  en- 
forcement stage,  however, the  complex standard will  be  more 
costly to employ. Thus, whether the simple rule or complex stan- 
dard is superior depends on whether the benefits from the stan- 
dard-which  arise from its complexity-exceed  the additional  costs 
90.  For  a  discussion  of  the  circumstances  in  which  individuals  would  choose  to  be- 
come  informed,  see  id. 
91.  Observe  that  it  is  plausible  that  a  relatively  simple  rule  would  guide  behavior 
more  precisely  than  would  a  complex  standard, as  individuals  might  know  all  the  modest 
content  of  the  former  but  none  of  the  potentially  very  detailed  content  of  the  latter.  In 
this  instance,  the  complex  standard  would  be  more  over-  and  underinclusive  with  regard 
to  its effect on  behavior  than  the  simple  rule. 
92.  Because  the  legal  regime  imposes  strict  liability  equal  to  harm  actually  caused, 
this  adjustment  in  behavior  will  tend  to  be  desirable,  as  explored  in  Section  III(C). 
93.  This  is  the  opposite  of  the  result  with  case  3  in  Part  I.  The  reason  is  that,  in 
the  other  case,  individuals  learned  the  content  of  the  rule  (but  not  of  the  standard)  and 
conformed  their  behavior.  Here,  the  simple  rule  has  no  content  to  guide  behavior  aside 
from  what  individuals  already  know,  but  the  complex  standard does  and  individuals  learn 
its  content. 
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of the standard-which arise from both its complexity and its pro- 
mulgation as a standard.94 
Consider the case in which the latter scenario prevails (indi- 
viduals learn of  how the complex standard would apply to  their 
conduct) and the balance of factors is such that the complex stan- 
dard is more desirable than the simple rule.95  It still remains to 
ask whether the complex standard is more desirable than a com- 
plex rule-that  is, one that determines in advance which chemicals 
are harmful.  (Recall the hazardous  substance illustration  in Section 
B.)  Such a  complex rule would have  higher promulgation costs 
than the complex standard, but lower advice costs and lower en- 
forcement costs. This comparison between a  complex rule and a 
complex standard is simply that between rules and standards, as 
presented in Part I. The components unique to the comparison be- 
tween the  simple rule and complex standard emphasized in  this 
Section  are  those  going  to  whether  complexity  is  desirable.9 
Study of  this  example thus reinforces the  view  that  comparing 
simple rules and  complex standards consists of  two  operations: 
analyzing complexity and analyzing the desirability of  giving con- 
tent  to  the  law ex ante versus ex post. 
D.  Are  Standards Systematically  More  Complex in  Application 
than Rules? 
Sections A  through C  described the  analytic difference be- 
tween the dimensions of the time (ex ante versus ex post) at which 
the law is given content and complexity. This final Section casts 
into doubt commonly expressed beliefs concerning the relationship 
between these two dimensions in practice. 
94.  If it were not complex, there would be nothing to determine ex post other than 
what is  required to  apply the posited simple rule; if  it  were not  a  standard, the cost 
would have been incurred  (once) at the promulgation  stage. 
95.  Of course, if the complex standard is less desirable, it is  still important to  ask 
whether a complex rule might be superior to the simple rule. 
96.  It is apparent from the discussion how one would compare a simple rule and a 
complex rule. But one could equally apply the discussion to standards,  which, if simple, 
invoke the principle  of average harm for the class of activity but, if complex, invoke the 
principle  of harm for the particular  activity in the class. (For example, standards  of "rea- 
sonableness"  often are applied in an "objective"  manner that looks to typical characteris- 
tics of a group of actors rather than to particular  characteristics  of  the actor in a given 
case.) 
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Discussions often refer simply to rules and standards,  indicat- 
ing  that  the  former tend  to  be  over-  and underinclusive. This 
characterization  implicitly assumes that standards  tend to be more 
complex than rules in the domains contemplated. This view may 
reflect that lawyers and legal academics  are always able to imagine 
countless factors (arguments)  that a decisionmaker  might take into 
account if only it is permitted to do so. (Such imagining  applies to 
rules as well, but standards are seen  as allowing more room to 
maneuver.) This, however, is a romantic  perspective,  hardly a valid 
depiction of actual decisionmaking.97 
As  the Introduction noted, there are two fundamental prob- 
lems  with  the  assumption that  standards inherently encompass 
more relevant considerations and thus achieve a  better fit  with 
underlying norms. First, standards need  not  admit all  consider- 
ations.98  (In contrast, a  rule may contain provisions that depend 
on factors that are not admissible  under a standard.)  Second, even 
standards  that admit broader consideration  ex post may not oper- 
ate in a more precise manner, as illustrated  by the example in the 
Introduction  in which juries consistently  make their decisions based 
on the same two or three of dozens of relevant factors. One sus- 
pects  that if  automobile design or  workplace health and safety 
requirements  were left to juries under a reasonableness standard, 
juries might tend to  focus on a handful of  factors that are most 
salient and easiest to comprehend."  Thus, ignoring random error, 
the rule equivalent to the standard  may depend on only a handful 
of factors and a simple weighting formula, nothing as complex as 
the analysis developed and the rules promulgated by auto safety 
regulators or  OSHA. The  same can be  said with regard to  the 
federal income tax, as noted in the Introduction."?? 
97.  Some  commentators  emphasize  that  standards cannot  simply  be  assumed  to  func- 
tion  without  error. See  Schauer, supra note  4,  at 685-86  (decisionmakers  unconstrained  by 
rules  will  err,  and  this  risk  of  error  need  not  be  less  than  that  which  would  arise  from 
faithful  application  of  over-  and  underinclusive  rules). 
98.  Cf.  id.  at  648  n.6  (distinguishing  the  case  in  which  the  decisionmaker  consults  a 
single  background  justification  for  a  rule  from  that  in  which  all  possible  justificatory 
norms  may  be  considered). 
99.  Also,  over  time  jury  instructions  may  be  developed  that  limit  juries'  focus.  See 
supra  note  14.  Such  instructions  might  be  analogized  to  precedents  (a  form  of  rules), 
discussed  in  Section  I(C)  and  subsection  IV(B)(1). 
100.  An  example  that  might  be  more  familiar  to  many  readers  of  this  Article  is  the 
determination  of  financial  aid.  If  financial  aid  is  determined  based  on  "need,  all  things 
considered,"  one  might  expect  that  case-by-case  judgments  would,  in  practice,  ignore 
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There is  a simple explanation, explored in Section I(D),  for 
the  fact  that rule  systems are  often  complex compared to  the 
results that  actually would  arise  under standards. Case-by-case 
creations (and re-creations) of  complex formulas are  expensive. 
When one economizes on that process, recognizing  that the formu- 
la is to  be used only once, it is sensible to  oversimplify greatly, 
and thus to consider only the factors most likely to be important. 
When one  makes a single pronouncement that will govern many 
(perhaps millions) of  cases, it is worthwhile to  undertake greater 
investigation  into the relevance of additional  factors and to expend 
more effort fine-tuning the weight accorded to  each. Thus, when 
rules  are  to  be  applicable to  frequent behavior with  recurring 
characteristics,  there is a systematic tendency for rule systems to 
be more complex than the content that would actually be given to 
standards  covering the same activity. In contrast, when the behav- 
ior to  be  regulated by law is  infrequent, or when each instance 
(no one very likely to occur) is unique in important  ways, substan- 
tial ex ante analysis for each conceivable contingency would be  a 
poor investment, whereas ex post determinations  under standards 
are made with the knowledge that the scenario has indeed arisen. 
As  emphasized in Part I, frequency is a central consideration de- 
termining  the relative desirability  of rules and standards.  Here, we 
see  that it is similarly relevant when considering the costs of em- 
ploying more complex laws.10' 
many subtleties, overstating  need in one case (because, for example, nontaxable sources 
of income are overlooked) and understating  need in another case (because, for example, 
insufficient  attention is given to how parents' other dependents  dilute the parents' ability 
to pay). A  complex rule scheme that is applied rather mechanically  (at far less cost per 
case) may be much less over- and underinclusive  than such case-by-case  judgments  would 
be. 
101.  There is  also an important  synergy between complexity and the choice of  rules 
and standards (which implies that the optimal rule and optimal standard may differ in 
content). The degree of  complexity affects frequency, in the sense used in this Article. 
See infra Section III(B). Consider the  following example. There are  100 possible acts 
subject to a law, each with a 10% chance of ever arising. If complexity is of little value 
(that is, if the acts are rather similar,  so little is lost by treating them identically),  a rule 
may be cheaper:  The promulgation  cost differential  is borne only once while the costs of 
interpretation  by individuals  and enforcers are expected to  be  borne 10 times (10% X 
100). In contrast, if complexity is of great value and each of the 100 acts is really quite 
different, calling for different legal treatments,  a standard  may be cheaper: With a rule, 
100 decisions must be made, whereas with a standard  individuals  and enforcers  need only 
address the 10 acts that actually arise. This suggests that when complexity is important, 
frequency in  the relevant sense will be  less. Of course, if  frequency is  still sufficiently 
great, the relative benefit of  rules may be  even greater when complexity is  important. 
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It is curious, therefore, that most commentators assume that 
standards tend to be complex in operation compared to the rules 
that might replace them, with little effort devoted to  comparing 
standards  that are simplistic in application with complex rule sys- 
tems."02  The main point to recognize is that there is no universal 
tendency for standards as they are actually applied to  be  more 
complex than rules that would plausibly be promulgated.103  Thus, 
subsuming the benefits of  complexity under the  banner of  stan- 
dards or those of  simplicity under the banner of  rules not  only 
obscures the  analysis, as  suggested in  Section B,  but  does  not 
correspond  very well to the legal universe. 
III.  EXTENSIONS 
A.  The Accessibility of  Rules and Standards 
In Part I, it was suggested that individuals  will find it cheaper 
to  learn how  rules would apply to  their circumstances than to 
learn how standards would apply, because the former will have 
already been given content whereas the latter will require predict- 
ing the content that a later decisionmaker  will provide. As  a re- 
sult, rules tend to be preferable  with regard to individual  behavior, 
because individuals  will expend fewer resources learning about the 
law  and will  learn more under rules and thus behave more in 
accordance  with the law. If, instead, it were cheaper to learn about 
standards,  these aspects of the argument would be reversed. This 
Section considers the plausibility  of the view that standards,  rather 
than  rules,  would  typically be  more  accessible. Ultimately, of 
First,  because  the  cost  of  learning  about  rules  is  less,  it  is  more  likely  that  behavior  will 
reflect  the  law  (which  is  more  important  when  there  are  important  differences  among 
individuals'  acts  that  the  law  takes  into  account).  Second,  there  may  be  economies  of 
scale  in  making  the  inquiries  at  the  promulgation  stage:  Determining  the  appropriate 
treatment  for  each  of  the  100  possible  acts  may  cost  little  more  than  for  one  act  (be- 
cause  the  same  investigation  may  yield  most  of  the  relevant  information).  In  that  case,  a 
rule  would  entail  bearing  the  investigation  cost-which  may  be  unusually  large  with  com- 
plex  phenomena-once  while  the  standard may  require  that  it  be  borne  10  times  in  en- 
forcement  proceedings  (and,  possibly,  additional  times  when  individuals  act). 
102.  Perhaps  the  bias  arises  because  prior authors  have  been  more  familiar with  laws 
such  as  the  negligence  rule  for  automobile  accidents  than  with  public  regulatory  regimes. 
103.  The  question  is  meaningful  only  if  one  is  considering  a  particular  legal  con- 
text-i.e.,  whether  traffic  laws  should  be  formulated  as  rules  or  standards-rather  than 
comparing  the  complexity  of  a  rule  in  one  area  of  law  to  that  of  a  standard  in  another. 
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course, the question is empirical;  whatever the correct answer is in 
a given context, the general framework  of Part I could be applied. 
In some instances, it might appear that a standard would be 
easier for individuals  to apply because some cases will be obvious 
under the standard, whereas if  the rule is complex, it  may take 
some  effort  to  verify that no  exception applies. This  construct 
implicitly assumes that, under a  standard, modest  effort  would 
yield a rather confident (but probably  not perfectly certain) predic- 
tion, whereas under a rule, either substantial effort would be ex- 
pended to yield nearly complete certainty or little effort would be 
applied, leaving the individual  with little idea of the governing law. 
But  in  most  instances, these  assumptions are  inconsistent: The 
likely (if not certain) result will often be just as obvious under the 
complex rule as under the standard. For example, under a stan- 
dard requiring safe driving, most drivers would readily anticipate 
that driving at night without headlights illuminated or parking in 
the middle of  an intersection would be  proscribed. At  the same 
time,  much  unsafe  driving behavior is  currently prohibited by 
specific traffic regulations, most of  which drivers have probably 
never read; surely, such drivers have no  difficulty guessing, with 
high confidence, what these unseen rules require in most instances. 
Individuals subject to  a complex rule system will only make 
additional expenditures, to achieve higher confidence in their pre- 
dictions, if the perceived value exceeds the perceived cost. But this 
can  be  true only  if  individuals are  in  fact  materially uncertain 
about what the  rules would say  about their contemplated con- 
duct."04  For  example, drivers of  trucks that transport dangerous 
substances might check which roads or bridges are closed to such 
traffic. In precisely such instances, however, drivers probably will 
be uncertain  about what content would be given to a standard  that 
limited driving to  "appropriate"  routes.105  And,  if  legal advice is 
104.  Cf.  SCHAUER,  supra note  1,  at  139  (rules  enhance  predictability  when  actors  can- 
not  otherwise  predict  how  an  adjudicator  would  resolve  the  case  because  actors  and 
adjudicators  do  not  have  common  outlooks,  but  they  do  share  common  language). 
105.  Recall  that  the  comparisons  thus  far  deal  with  rules  and  standards  that  would 
have  the  same  content  if  the  same  effort  were  applied  in  giving  each  content-that  is, 
where  the  process  producing  the  rule  considers  the  same  factors,  giving  them  the  same 
weight,  as  the  process  that  will  later  give  content  to  the  standard. 
A  qualification  arises when,  because  of  the  frequency  of  potential  application,  great- 
er  effort  would  be  expended  ex  ante  in  designing  a  rule  than  ex post  in  applying  a  stan- 
dard.  In  that  case,  there  may  be  detailed  distinctions  made  in  the  rule  that  would  not  be 
made  in  applying  a  standard.  (This  is  precisely  the  instance  noted  in  Section  II(D),  in 
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to be obtained in such a case, one would expect, as before, that 
rules could usually be predicted at lower cost than standards,  pre- 
cisely because more content has been provided in advance. Thus, 
with the rule, one would perhaps simply consult an official map. 
In contrast, under the standard,  it would be necessary to ascertain 
the weight given to various factors by adjudicators  and the actual 
circumstances  of each route (such as population density, presence 
of groundwater,  and the like). 
The possibility that standards  will be more accessible to indi- 
viduals than rules might be rationalized on account of the differ- 
ences in the institutions that give content to  each.106  The implicit 
scenario is  one  in  which a  legal command, if  promulgated as  a 
rule, will be  given technical detail by lawyers or  other relevant 
experts-whereas  standards  will be given content through decisions 
of lay juries, who will rely on common understandings  (rather than 
on,  say, expert testimony)."07  For the argument to  work, it must 
further be  assumed that the  content given to  standards by  lay 
decisionmakers will  diverge significantly from  the  content  that 
experts would choose to give to rules. Otherwise, individuals  guid- 
ed  by common understandings  would be  equally able to  comply 
with the technical rules, as the preceding  discussion explains. 
This  version of  the  argument has  important shortcomings. 
First, these  implicitly assumed features of  rules  and  standards 
would involve choices that could be made differently.  For example, 
if lay content were preferred for reasons of accessibility,  but rules 
were preferred to avoid costs of repeated ex post decisionmaking, 
one  could  assemble a  lay panel to  design rules, just  as  expert 
which  rules  are  more  complex  than  standards,  as  applied.)  To  the  extent  individuals 
subject  to  the  more  complex  rule  would  not  in  fact  expend  the  resources  necessary  to 
learn  and  thus  adjust  their  behavior  to  the  additional  detail  (or  if  the  expenditures  in 
learning  the  detail  were  not  socially  warranted),  it  would  not  be  optimal  ex  ante  to  de- 
sign  so  detailed  a  rule.  This  is  the  analysis  of  complexity,  presented  briefly  in  Section 
II(C),  which  was  there  distinguished  from  the  issue  of  the  appropriateness  of  giving  con- 
tent  to  the  law  ex  ante versus  ex post. 
106.  Institutional  differences  are  considered  further in  Section  IV(A). 
107.  See,  e.g.,  POSNER,  supra  note  1,  at  47-48.  Other  institutional  considerations  sug- 
gest  that  rules  might  be  more  accessible  to  individuals.  Representative  legislative  bodies 
or  administrators  subject  to  political  pressure  may  be  easier  to  predict  than  juries  or 
other  adjudicators,  because  of  possible  idiosyncrasies  of  the  latter-concerning  the 
decisionmakers  themselves  or  the  information  that  they  will  be  given  in  a  particular 
case-and  their  being  subject  to  different  influences. 
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testimony is used in adjudication  when society wishes standards  to 
be given content in a manner that incorporates  relevant expertise. 
Second, if experts would otherwise be appropriate  when rules 
are promulgated,  it must be because the content they will give to 
rules is superior to the differing  content that would be supplied by 
lay decisionmakers  ex post. This suggests that if standards would 
achieve greater conformity,  the conformity  is with commonly made 
mistakes rather than with underlying  norms. (If the experts' results 
are indeed no better, but just different, then the accessibility  argu- 
ment disfavors relying on experts, not ex ante creation of the law.) 
Finally, the scenario usually imagines that individuals  will not 
seek  advice to  guide  their behavior, which is  plausible for  the 
everyday activity of individuals that is unlikely to have significant 
legal consequences, but not for many other activities governed by 
legal commands.  If expertise is indeed helpful in designing the law, 
and if  the resulting law does  differ importantly from lay under- 
standings, then the tendency of technical rules to induce individu- 
als to  seek advice would be desirable. For example, suppose that 
in a regime covered by a standard that simply required appropri- 
ate disposal, most individuals  dump most chemicals down the drain 
because they suspect a lay jury would find this action appropriate 
(from the point of view of unsophisticated  actors, like themselves). 
Then, substituting  detailed rules, indicating  appropriate  methods of 
disposal for those chemicals that are hazardous,  may be helpful, as 
these individuals might then fear that they would be  in violation 
of the law and be induced to seek advice before acting.8 
B.  The Difficulty  of  Formulating Some  Laws as Rules 
It would appear that some legal commands cannot plausibly 
be  formulated as  rules. For example, it  may not  be  possible to 
108.  Observe  that  a  similar  result  might  follow  if  individuals  knew  that  their  liability 
would  be  adjudicated  by  experts,  or  by  a  lay  jury  instructed  that  the  standard  requires 
individuals  to  take  technologically  appropriate  action  and  informed  by  the  testimony  of 
experts  on  the  subject.  This  highlights  the  first  point,  that  the  desirability  of  expertise 
rather  than  lay  instinct  is,  in  principle,  substantially  separable  from  that  of  the  choice 
between  rules  and  standards.  In  practice,  there  may  be  an  important  connection  for  the 
reasons  described  in  Section  I(D):  If  a  rule  is  to  apply  to  many  individuals'  behavior, 
additional  investment  in  design  might  be  appropriate  (so  it  might  be  worth  investing 
substantially  in  expertise)  compared  to  the  situation  employing  standards.  Or,  if  a circum- 
stance  is  unlikely  to  arise,  ex  ante  investment  in  expertise  may  not  be  warranted  but, 
once  the  situation  has  arisen,  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  consult  experts. 
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specify in a zoning ordinance which building designs are aestheti- 
cally inappropriate,  but we may know them when we see them. Or 
we may be unable to specify in advance proper disposal techniques 
for all hazardous substances because we cannot foresee all poten- 
tial  hazards-whereas  some  hazards, and  how  best  to  address 
them, may become apparent  when they arise. 
Because of such factors, rules may seem not only to be inferi- 
or to standards,  but an entirely infeasible option. Such limitations 
of  rules, however, are already incorporated into the  analysis. In 
particular, they are largely reflected in  the frequency dimension 
emphasized in Part I, and also in the discussion of promulgation 
versus  enforcement costs  in  Section  I(D).109  For  example,  the 
problem with building designs is that the possible permutations  are 
many. The cost of making an advance ruling on millions of possi- 
bilities would be excessive, as few would ever arise in any event. 
It is not the case, however, that nothing can profitably be deter- 
mined in  advance. Size  (square feet,  height), building materials, 
distance from the street, and other characteristics  could be articu- 
lated, leaving to some adjudicator  the task of undertaking  further 
review of submitted plans. 
The  choice  between  rules and standards is  one  of  degree. 
Deciding solely on the relevant criteria in advance may save costs 
for both individual  actors and adjudicators,  while providing  individ- 
uals some guidance. Also, adopting presumptions  or ruling certain 
options in  or  out  might be  possible. The  extent  to  which such 
approaches are desirable will depend on the anticipated  frequency 
of behavior with the relevant common elements. The commonality 
aspect is worth emphasizing  when defining frequency for the pur- 
poses of this Article. The law of negligence may cover millions of 
acts, but if most types have little in common with each other and 
are unlikely to arise, behavior at the relevant degree of detail is 
infrequent."?0  But if some particular  type of  act will arise even a 
dozen times, that may be  sufficiently frequent to  warrant an ex 
ante wholesale resolution of the problem. 
Yet  another limitation on  the  ability to  formulate laws  as 
rules  involves  limitations of  language. Even  if  there  is  precise 
109.  The  discussion  in  this  section  emphasizes  frequency.  The  added  cost  of  designing 
rules  when  events  are  difficult  to  anticipate  is  discussed  in  note  78. 
110.  This  discussion  highlights  a synergy between  the  issue  of  complexity  and  the  issue 
of  when  laws  should  be  given  content,  as  discussed  in  Part  II.  See supra  note  101. 
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consensus on  the  meaning of,  say, "vulgar behavior," it may be 
difficult to describe the set of behavior precisely and succinctly.  As 
with  the  example involving aesthetic zoning,  the  problem may 
involve frequency, as the range of vulgar behavior is substantial. 
If, however, the problem is simply that readily identifiable and 
recurring behavior is difficult to  describe, using a  rule may pose 
no  difficulty with regard to  the  issues addressed in  this Article. 
The rule could simply prohibit "vulgar  behavior." As  long as the 
relevant audience took this to refer to a familiar set of acts, an ex 
ante specification would have been made in the relevant sense."11 
That is, whether a law has been given content ex ante depends on 
whether information acquisition and processing that might require 
effort  has  been  completed,112  not  on  the  type of  language that 
best  communicates  the  results  of  ex  ante  investigation  and 
decisionmaking.113  This Article has focused on  the division of  ef- 
fort over time: A legal command is defined here to be rule-like to 
the extent that greater effort has been  expended ex ante, rather 
than requiring such effort to be made ex post.14 Thus, for a legal 
command prohibiting vulgar behavior to be viewed as a standard 
for  present purposes, it  would have  to  be  understood that the 
command authorizes the  adjudicator  to  make a  de novo  inquiry 
into what constitutes vulgar behavior, for only then would applica- 
tion of the standard be costly and difficult for individuals to pre- 
dict. To  the  extent  the  domain of  vulgar behavior would have 
been well understood, the decision to prohibit this category of ac- 
tivity, but  not  other  activity raising similar concerns, should be 
seen as a rule.115 
111.  See  Frederick  Schauer,  Formalism,  97  YALE L.J.  509,  512  n.8  (1988)  (using  the 
broadly  worded  university  honor  codes  of  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  as  an 
example of commonly understood  precepts). 
112.  After all, even a precise rule-one  prohibiting  driving in excess of 55 miles per 
hour-requires some effort to interpret. 
113.  See supra  Section  I(E);  infra subsection  IV(B)(3);  cf.  ATIYAH &  SUMMERS,  supra 
note  1,  at  81-83  (instances in  which English laws appear less rule-like than American 
laws may still entail a more formal, predictable  approach  in England because of its more 
developed customary norms arising from the greater homogeneity of  the British people 
and  English  judiciary);  Sanford  Levinson,  Some  Reflections  on  the  Posnerian  Constitution, 
56 GEO. WASH.  L.  REV. 39, 40 n.2 (1987) (what may appear to an outsider as a rule 
might be understood  by an insider as a standard,  or vice versa). 
114.  See  supra  subsection  I(A)(1)  (emphasizing  that  the  motivation  for  the  problem  is 
that  the  ideal  content  of  the  law  is  not  immediately  apparent);  Section  I(E). 
115.  A  related  limitation  on  formulating  laws  as  rules  may  involve  the  reluctance  to 
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C.  The Private Versus Social  Value of  Legal Advice 
Whenever individuals  acquire legal advice, the question arises 
whether their decisions to do so are socially desirable. Answering 
this question involves comparing the effect of advice on behavior 
with the cost of advice. In subsection I(B)(3)-analyzing  the case 
in  which individuals would acquire advice under a  rule but not 
under a standard-it  was noted that the overall effect of obtaining 
advice is necessarily desirable if the private value of advice equals 
the social value of  advice.'16  The reason for this result is that in- 
dividuals only acquire advice when its private value exceeds its 
cost; so  in this case, it must be  that the social benefit of  advice 
exceeds its cost. 
In  addition, the  discussion in  Section I(D)  emphasized that 
individuals' decisions to  acquire advice are a  matter of  degree. 
Individuals may, for example, choose to  become more informed 
about rules because the cost of advice is cheaper. In such instanc- 
es, their total expenditure  on advice may be greater under rules or 
under standards. (Under standards, even when less advice is  ac- 
quired, the cost for a given amount of  advice is greater, so  the 
total cost may be greater.) If expenditures  are greater under stan- 
dards, but individuals are more informed under rules-and  more 
informed  individuals  act  more  in  accord  with  underlying 
norms-the  net effect of advice at this stage would tend to favor 
draft precise  legal  commands  except  in  simple  "on/off" forms or  as  expressing  linear  rela- 
tionships.  For  example,  suppose  that  the  ideal  formula  for  the  level  of  care  depended  on 
the  variables  x  and  y,  so  that  there  should  be  liability  if  and  only  if  x2y exceeds  some 
particular  level.  After  hearing  (possibly  expert)  testimony,  a  factfinder  might  (approxi- 
mately)  reach  correct  conclusions  under  a  standard.  A  rule  could  substitute  if  it  indeed 
provided  for  liability  as  a  function  of  the  stated  condition.  But  if  the  rule  drafter  were 
limited  to  having  separate  on/off  tests  for  x  and  y,  or  possibly  allowing  x  and  y  to  be 
added,  the  best  rule  may  lead  to  many  poor  results.  Judgments  of  factfinders  often  may 
reflect  (roughly)  complex  interactions  of  variables  that  we  tend  not  to  write  in  rules 
(except  perhaps  in  the  tax  law  and  some  other  complex  statutory  or  regulatory  schemes). 
Related,  judicial  precedents  and  jury  instructions  tend  toward  simple  formulations;  when 
these  are  found  unsatisfactory,  multiple  factor  tests  or  commands  to  consider  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  are  promulgated,  often  with  little  further guidance.  See  infra note  155. 
The  option  of  a  rule  specifying  a  complex  interaction  does  not  usually  receive  serious 
attention.  See generally  S0ren  Bisgaard,  Design  of  Standards and  Regulations,  154 J.  ROY- 
AL  STAT.  SOC'Y  93  (1991)  (ambiguity  can  often  be  reduced  using  statistical  methods  and 
concepts  when  laws  are  designed);  Ogus,  supra  note  1  (discussing  dichotomy  between 
general  and  complex,  precise  rules,  and  the  recent  trend  in judicial  preference  for  gener- 
ality). 
116.  See  also  supra  note  44  (discussing  the  possibility  that  the  private  value  of  advice 
is  greater  than  or  less  than  its  social  value). 
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rules.117  Determining whether the  net  effect  at  this stage favors 
rules or standards  in other situations and quantifying  the net effect 
requires that one examine the relationship  between the private and 
social values of legal advice. Observe that if the private and social 
values of advice are equal, then whatever level of advice individu- 
als acquire will be socially appropriate,  producing benefits of  ad- 
vice  in  excess of  the  cost of  advice-taking  as given whether a 
rule or standard prevails. Moreover, to the extent the cost of ad- 
vice is lower under rules than under standards,  rules will necessari- 
ly be preferable on account of this factor.118 
The subject of  the social value of  legal advice deserves and 
has  received separate treatment.119  A  few  themes will  be  noted 
here. First, there is an important  instance in which the private and 
social values of advice will be equal: when individuals  will be held 
liable for  the  full  costs  of  any  harm they  cause.12 Because  an 
individual bears all the consequences of  each act, it follows that 
advice guiding the  choice  among acts will  have  a  value  to  the 
individual that  reflects its  social  value.121  Second, to  the  extent 
that the legal system does not provide liability equal to the actual 
harm of  acts,  there  generally will  be  divergences between  the 
private and social values of  legal  advice.1  For  example, under 
some  circumstances the  private value  of  advice will  be  socially 
excessive under a negligence rule, because individuals  value escap- 
117.  Advice  at  this stage may affect total costs at  the  enforcement stage, because 
advice may affect the number of  lawsuits that later occur. An  optimal law of  damages 
would take into account both the direct harm caused by acts and the enforcement  costs, 
which can have the effect of internalizing  this cost at the time individuals  decide whether 
to acquire legal advice and how to act. See KAPLOW,  supra note 89, at 8-9; see also A. 
Mitchell  Polinsky  &  Steven  Shavell,  Enforcement  Costs  and  the  Optimal  Probability  and 
Magnitude  of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON.  133 (1992). If enforcement  costs were thus internal- 
ized, individuals' decisions concerning the  acquisition of  information and level  of  care 
would be  optimal. (Promulgation  costs are sunk at  the  time individuals'  decisions are 
made.) If there is an external effect on enforcement  costs, it is not clear that it would 
tend to  favor more or less advice, as advice may lead individuals  to  take actions that 
would result in fewer or more subsequent  lawsuits.  See supra note 41. 
118.  When social value is  reflected in  private demand, a  reduction in  the  resource 
cost of supplying  a good or service-here,  legal advice-is  desirable. 
119.  See  Louis  Kaplow  &  Steven  Shavell,  Private  Versus Socially  Optimal  Provision  of 
Ex  Ante  Legal  Advice,  8  J.L.  ECON. &  ORGANIZATION  306  (1992). 
120.  See also supra note 117 (discussing  subsequent  enforcement  costs as a component 
of the harm of an individual's  act). 
121.  For a formal demonstration,  see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 119, at 308-09. 
122.  The examples that follow and others are analyzed  in id. at 309-16. 
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ing liability entirely when they take due care, despite the fact that 
they nonetheless cause harm.23  Third, to the extent there is legal 
error (for  example, systematic misassessment of  damages) that 
individuals can better anticipate with the aid of  legal advice, the 
private value of  advice may be socially excessive.12  Moreover, in 
this instance, advice tends to be socially undesirable  even without 
regard to its cost, because advice leads individuals  to behave less 
in accord with underlying  norms.25 
If one adopts the view common (if often implicit) in discus- 
sions of rules and standards  that greater knowledge of the law by 
individuals  subject to it is desirable,  the tendency for individuals  to 
be more knowledgeable of rules because of the lower cost of ad- 
vice about them would favor rules. Recognizing that the private 
and social values of  advice need  not  be  equal complicates the 
argument. Divergences between the private and social values of 
123.  The  text  speaks  of  a  negligence  rule,  a  term  most  commonly  used  in  describing 
accident  law.  The  concept,  however,  is  more  general.  Any  law  in  which  liability  only 
arises  when  care  is  unreasonable  in  some  respect  is  a  negligence  regime  for  present  pur- 
poses.  See  id.  at  317.  For  further  discussion  of  behavior  when  there  is  uncertainty  re- 
garding application  of  the  negligence  rule,  see  supra  note  42. 
124.  The  mere  existence  of  error  is  not  sufficient,  as  long  as  individuals  (even  with 
legal  advice)  expect  the  law  to  be  applied  properly,  or  if  individuals  do  not  expect  there 
to  be  systematic  biases  in  what  enforcement  tribunals will  award. 
125.  The  possibility  that  predictable  legal  error  will  lead  to  worse  behavior  might  in 
some  contexts  favor  standards over  rules  for  the  very  reason  that  individuals  will  be  un- 
aware  of  the  content  of  standards whereas  they  would  become  informed  about  rules.  The 
scenario  is  as  follows.  Individuals  know  the  true character of  their  acts  (as  they  would  be 
evaluated  by  an  omniscient  social  authority),  but  the  government-when  promulgating 
rules  or  applying  standards-cannot  determine  their  true  character.  Rather,  it  makes 
random  errors.  If  these  errors will  be  made  under  a  standard-and  thus  after  individuals 
decide  how  to  act-the  actual  error  with  regard  to  a  particular type  of  behavior  cannot 
be  precisely  predicted.  But  if  an  ex  ante determination  of  the  appropriate  treatment  of  a 
particular act  is  made,  any  error  will  be  knowable  before  individuals  act,  so  it  may  lead 
them  to  act  in  an  undesirable  manner.  This  example  illustrates  how  advice  about  er- 
ror-whether  error  embodied  in  a  rule  or  the  prediction  of  error  likely  to  be  made  in 
applying  a  standard-can  be  socially  undesirable.  It  also  suggests  that  errors  under  stan- 
dards will  be  important  with  regard to  behavior  only  to  the  extent  individuals can  antici- 
pate  the  errors  at  the  time  they  act,  perhaps  when  aided  by  legal  advice.  But  see  supra 
note  42  (mere  uncertainty  under  a negligence  rule  may  adversely  affect  behavior).  To  the 
extent  error  will  be  anticipated,  greater  expenditures  on  ex post  accuracy would  be  war- 
ranted.  (This  problem  also  creates  a  rationale  for  making  errors  difficult  to  predict-for 
example,  by  forbidding  contact  with  jurors  when  interviews  might  reveal  bases  for  deci- 
sion  unrelated  to  the  underlying  legal  norms.)  As  noted  in  subsection  I(D)(3),  if  behavior 
is  frequent,  greater  investment  in  giving  content  to  rules  than  to  standards  would  be 
appropriate.  This  suggests  that  the  problem  of  error may  be  greater  under  standards. RULES  VERSUS STANDARDS 
advice could favor either formulation relative to  the  balance of 
factors that otherwise would prevail. 
D.  Risk Aversion 
Risk aversion is relevant to the analysis of rules and standards 
for  two  reasons.12 First, individuals' behavior will  reflect  their 
risk preferences.  The most important  implication  is that individuals 
will place a greater value on legal advice because advice reduces 
their uncertainty.127  This suggests that it  may be  more valuable 
than otherwise for  the  cost  of  legal advice to  be  low,  a  factor 
favoring rules. 
Second, when individuals  are risk averse, their bearing of risk 
is socially undesirable.  Because individuals  tend to be less:well in- 
formed  concerning standards, they  may  bear  more  risk  under 
standards,  which would favor rules. Another consideration is that 
the precision with which laws are actually applied may affect the 
risk individuals bear. (For example, to  the  extent liability is  de- 
signed to  compensate uninsured victims, it  is  important that the 
compensation reflect actual losses.)  This factor may favor stan- 
dards, to the extent they can better take advantage of information 
available only ex post, or it may favor rules if less is invested in 
applying standards (because the investment will apply to only one 
case).1" 
126.  Risk  aversion  is  also  relevant  to  Part II's discussion  of  complexity.  More  complex 
rules,  which  some  individuals  will  not  learn,  might  result  in  more  risk  being  imposed. 
(Whether  more  risk  is  indeed  imposed  is  formally  ambiguous.  See  KAPLOW,  supra  note 
89.)  If  more  risk were  imposed,  simpler  (and,  as  a  result,  more  over-  or  underinclusive) 
laws-whether  rules  or  standards-would  tend  to  be  favored. 
127.  This  additional  private  value  of  advice  is  also  a  social  value,  because  risk-bearing 
costs  are  social  costs.  Thus,  the  presence  of  risk aversion  has  no  direct  effect  on  whether 
there  will  be  a  divergence  between  the  private  and  social  values  of  legal  advice,  as  dis- 
cussed  in  Section  C. 
128.  The  appropriate  investment  in  designing  rules  and  applying  standards  may  be 
determined  in  part  by  considerations  of  accurate  compensation,  in  addition  to  the  ability 
of  the  law  to  influence  behavior,  which  has  been  the  focus  throughout.  This  might  favor 
greater  effort  in  giving  content  to  the  law  (to  fine-tune  victim  compensation)  or  less  (be- 
cause  individuals  will  not  be  fully  informed  at  the  time  they  act  or  because  the  actual 
harm  to  a  particular,  unidentified  victim  cannot  be  predicted,  so  that  fine-tuning  ex  post 
entails  greater  risk  ex  ante  for  those  committing  acts).  See  KAPLOW  &  SHAVELL,  supra 
note  51,  at  18-19. 
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E.  Objectives of the Law  Other than Deterrence 
The analysis thus far has focused on the purpose and effect of 
law with regard to controlling behavior ex ante.129  Individuals  who 
anticipate the possibility of sanctions will adjust their behavior ac- 
cordingly.  This Section briefly notes the extent to which the analy- 
sis is applicable  to other objectives of the law. The relevant objec- 
tives often depend on the nature of the sanction and on the type 
of legal proceeding. 
The  law uses not  only monetary sanctions but also  specific 
relief, such as injunctions  in the civil context130  and the incarcera- 
tion of criminals.  The anticipation  of such nonmonetary sanctions 
obviously influences behavior ex ante, and to that extent the pre- 
vious analysis is applicable. Because there are also ex post effects 
on  behavior, however, the value of  precision at the enforcement 
stage is  greater than it  otherwise would be.  Thus, if  extremely 
harmful activities are to  be  permanently enjoined or  dangerous 
individuals  are to be removed from society, it is valuable to invest 
resources to make accurate determinations  in adjudication  even if 
the enhanced accuracy does not affect ex ante behavior (because 
individuals would not invest in legal advice to a sufficient extent 
to refine their predictions). This favors both greater effort in de- 
signing rules and in giving content to standards.131  And, whichev- 
er  formulation results in  a  more accurate resolution of  specific 
cases will tend to be favored.132 
129.  An  exception is  the  argument in  Section D  that the outcome of  enforcement 
proceedings  will affect the extent to which actors and victims bear risk. 
130.  The effect of  injunctions  depends on  how enforcement and bargaining  actually 
operate. For example, if an injured  party would negotiate for a payment in lieu of pur- 
suing injunctive relief, the effect may be  the same for present purposes as if  the law 
provided for damages of that amount. 
An important  form of injunctive  relief in which future conduct is a primary  consid- 
eration  is  licensing.  See,  e.g.,  Diver,  supra  note  1,  at  79. 
131.  Considerations of  ex  post  effects  of  laws  are  relevant when  evaluating the 
law/equity distinction that was basic to  Anglo-American  law until developments in this 
century led to the currently  often-held view that the distinction  serves no social function. 
Because equitable remedies are nonmonetary,  the appropriate  proceeding  for determining 
their application  and the optimal content of governing legal commands  is different from 
that for remedies at law-damages. Whether  actual differences  in legal and equitable pro- 
ceedings historically  or presently  reflect this concern is another matter. 
132.  As noted previously,  standards  may provide more accurate  resolutions  because of 
information  made available ex post, or less accurate  resolutions  because it is appropriate 
to invest less effort when the investment  will be used in a single adjudication  rather than 
in a rule that would apply to many cases and because economies of scale possible at the 
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Even when the law provides purely monetary relief, there may 
be objectives in addition to deterrence. As explored in the preced- 
ing  Section, the  compensation victims receive  and  the  amounts 
injurers pay will be independently significant when individuals are 
risk averse. Accuracy of results will be of greater importance be- 
cause  it  is  desirable  that  victim  compensation reflects  actual 
losses,"33  while greater accuracy ex post is not obviously valuable 
for injurers.13  As  a related matter, some laws involve government 
transfers, such as  Social Security payments to  disabled workers. 
Here, accuracy is relevant primarily  with regard to providing cor- 
rect compensation.135 
In addition to affecting future behavior and the ability of the 
legal system to achieve compensatory  objectives, accurate  outcomes 
may be viewed as an important determinant  of the fairness of the 
legal  system. If  so,  greater investment in  the  promulgation and 
application of  laws may be  warranted than otherwise and there 
would be an additional  reason to prefer whichever mode of formu- 
lation tends to produce greater accuracy.  Regardless of the weight 
generally thought appropriate  to such fairness concerns, note that 
accuracy  in the present context has an important  characteristic  dis- 
tinguishing  it from many others: Individuals  may not anticipate the 
results. Recall that accuracy will not always influence ex ante be- 
havior precisely because the ultimate application of  laws may be 
too  difficult to  predict.136  Even when standards provide more ac- 
rule promulgation  stage may be unavailable  when standards  are applied. See supra Sec- 
tion I(D);  note  101; see also supra Section II(D)  (rule systems may be  more detailed 
than standards  as actually applied). 
133.  To the extent compensation  is motivated by risk aversion, monetary losses (with 
a possible adjustment  for changes in the marginal  value of money caused by the injury) 
rather than total  losses  would be  relevant. See  SHAVELL, supra note  42,  at  228-31, 
245-47. 
134.  Greater fine-tuning of  damages to  actual losses may increase the  risk injurers 
bear without materially affecting their behavior. (Greater risk will deter, but the  addi- 
tional deterrence may be excessive and, if it is desirable, could be  achieved, say, by in- 
creasing damages.) 
135.  The  context of  welfare payments is  perhaps that in  which accuracy has been 
most discussed, provoked by the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S.  319  (1976).  See,  e.g.,  Jerry  L.  Mashaw,  The  Supreme  Court's  Due  Process  Calculus 
for  Administrative  Adjudication  in  Mathews  v.  Eldridge:  Three  Factors  in  Search  of  a 
Theory of  Value, 44  U.  CHI. L.  REV. 28  (1976).  The  extent  to  which  such  determinations 
are to be governed by rules is one important  element determining  the ultimate accuracy 
of outcomes. See,  e.g., Diver, supra note 1, at 88-92. See generally  JERRY L.  MASHAW, 
BUREAUCRATIC  JUSTICE:  MANAGING  SOCIAL  SECURITY  DISABILITY  CLAIMS  (1983). 
136.  Cf.  Louis  Kaplow  &  Steven  Shavell,  Legal  Advice  About  Information  to  Present 
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curate resolutions of  particular cases, individuals may not  have 
effective notice of the result an adjudicator  would reach and thus 
would be unable to act in light of it. Thus, even when rules will 
be less accurate in providing results that are appropriate  to actual 
circumstances-which they often will not be137-they will tend to 
provide clearer notice than standards to  individuals at  the  time 
they decide how to act.138 
IV.  FURTHER  CONSIDERATIONS 
This Part comments on additional  issues relevant in comparing 
rules and standards. There is no  attempt to  be  exhaustive or to 
analyze the issues in depth. (Many have been discussed elsewhere 
and most warrant  further study.) Rather, the purpose is simply to 
note  important factors that are related to  the  discussion in  the 
preceding Parts. 
A.  Promulgation  and  Enforcement  of  Law  by  Different  Govern- 
ment Institutions 
The discussion  thus far has suggested that the costs of promul- 
gating and applying laws may differ for rules and standards.  Rea- 
sons for such a difference that arise because rules are given con- 
tent ex ante and standards  ex post have been emphasized.  Another 
reason that promulgation and enforcement costs, as  well  as  the 
content of rules and standards,  may differ is that different govern- 
ment institutions  may be involved at the two stages. 
Beginning with the most commonly assumed context, consider 
some  of  the  differences between  legislatures, which promulgate 
many laws, and courts, which often apply them. Legislatures may 
be better equipped to draw upon technical expertise than courts. 
Also,  through the use of  committees and staffs, legislatures may 
develop more expertise of their own. On the other hand, legisla- 
in Litigation:  Its Effects and Social Desirability,  102 HARV.  L. REV.  565, 603 (1989) (dis- 
cussing how legal advice in litigation  may not align sanctions  with individuals'  ex ante un- 
derstanding  of the law because such advice affects sanctions  in a manner individuals  can- 
not anticipate). 
137.  See supra note  132 (factors determining  whether rules or  standards would be 
more accurate). 
138.  This may be  more fair, as individuals  are more able to comply with the actual 
content of the law, and more desirable in terms of the law's purposes to the extent that 
substantial  compliance  with imperfect  rules yields better results than poor compliance  with 
more nearly perfect standards. 
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tive agreement may be more difficult to achieve given the numbers 
of decisionmakers  and the division of authority.139  Courts, for bet- 
ter or worse, tend to  rely on  adversary proceedings in  reaching 
conclusions. Also, courts tend to be driven by the concrete facts of 
a particular  case, which may simplify judgment (one need not rely 
on  imagination to  anticipate contingencies) or  may mislead the 
decisionmaker  (as when the vividness of the instant case leads one 
to underemphasize  other cases that might be subject to  the same 
law40  or when hindsight is not understood to be superior to fore- 
sight).  Legislatures may  be  more  politically responsive, which 
might make some value judgments more legitimate (because they 
are more representative  of popular will) or more suspect (because 
they  reflect the  influence of  unrepresentative interest groups).'4' 
Rules may be preferred to standards in order to  limit discretion, 
thereby  minimizing abuses  of  power.142  Legislatures and  courts 
may each be more sensitive to costs that they directly incur than 
to costs incurred  by other institutions  or by individuals,  which may 
induce them to  prefer an otherwise inappropriate formulation.143 
139.  See,  e.g.,  Ehrlich  &  Posner,  supra  note  1,  at  267-68. 
140.  This  problem  is  particularly  important  if  a  precedent  is  to  be  created.  Related, 
relevant  "legislative  facts"  may  not  be  formally  admissible  in  a  particular  controversy. 
This  consideration  is  an  important  reason  that judges  are  inclined  to  favor  waiting  before 
announcing  precedents,  formulating  narrow  ones,  or  simply  deferring  to  the  legislature. 
See  infra  subsection  B(1);  see  also  supra  subsection  I(D)(3)  (when  adjudication  will  gov- 
ern  only  one  case  rather  than  many,  it  may  be  sensible  to  make  a  more  superficial  in- 
quiry). 
141.  Concerning  the  latter,  the  content  of  a  law  or  the  mode  of  formulation  may  be 
designed  to  serve  a  well-organized  group  to  the  disadvantage  of  most  citizens.  Alterna- 
tively,  a  legislature  may  delegate  authority  (to  agencies,  as  when  it  creates  a  commission 
and  empowers  it  to  promulgate  regulations,  or  to  courts,  as  when  it  enacts  a  standard) 
not  because  it  deems  delegation  optimal  in  principle  but  because  it  wishes  to  avoid  ac- 
countability.  See,  e.g.,  Diver,  supra  note  1,  at  106.  Related,  the  discussion  in  subsection 
B(1)  of  courts'  reluctance  to  establish  precedents  could  reflect  either  a view  as  to  what  is 
proper  or  a  desire  to  avoid  taking  responsibility. 
142.  See,  e.g.,  DAVIS,  supra  note  1;  POSNER,  supra  note  1,  at  44;  SCHAUER,  supra 
note  1,  at  150-51,  158-62;  Gavison,  supra  note  4,  at  753-54.  That  is,  it  may  be  feared 
that  courts,  agencies,  or  other  political  actors  will  provide  content  to  standards in  improp- 
er  ways.  In  contrast,  if  they  were  empowered  simply  to  apply  rules  there  would  be  less 
potential  for  such  abuse  because  improper  conduct  could  be  more  readily  detected.  See, 
e.g.,  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1,  at  150-55.  Cf.  RAZ, supra  note  5,  at  59-60  (rules  may  re- 
duce  risk of  error  because  content  is  determined  in  time  of  tranquillity). 
143.  For  example,  legislatures  may  favor  standards  because  the  ex  post  costs  are  in- 
curred  by  individuals  and  courts.  (Often  when  legislatures  fail  to  resolve  an  obvious  am- 
biguity  that  ultimately  will  be  resolved  by  courts  establishing  a  rule-as  in  the  failure  to 
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And the difficulty of learning about laws promulgated by legisla- 
tures may differ from those promulgated  by courts (as when con- 
tent  is  given  to  a  standard through precedent) because of  the 
manner in which legislative enactments and judicial opinions are 
written, published, and indexed.44 
An important  caveat in considering  these factors is that many 
are  not  inherent to  the  institution, but  rather reflect particular 
choices that have been made. For example, courts could be  spe- 
cialized (as some, such as the tax court, are) or have expert staffs. 
Judges could be selected differently so that they would tend to be 
responsive to  different forces.145  Precedents could be  established 
in a more rule-like fashion than is usually done. (Examples of such 
an  approach include  Miranda"46  and  Roe  v.  Wade.147) On  the 
other hand, some differences are intrinsic to the central question 
of this Article: whether the law is given content ex ante or ex post. 
Most  notably, standards allow  a  decisionmaker to  examine the 
concrete facts of a particular  case.14 
or  a  simple  mistake  is  the  explanation,  rather  than  some  intrinsic reason  that  a  standard 
is  preferable.  See  Maggs,  supra  note  47,  at  142-51  (documenting  and  examining  twenty 
recurring ambiguities  in  the  drafting of  statutes).)  Courts,  in  turn, may  favor  rules  to  the 
extent  that  they  reduce  the  courts'  own  future  costs,  or  standards,  because  they  save 
promulgation  costs  while  many  subsequent  costs  are  borne  by  private  parties  (or  different 
judges  in  future  cases).  Some  agencies  will  be  the  adjudicators  under  their  own  laws, 
whether  standards  or  rules,  so  they  bear  all  the  costs  at  stages  one  and  three,  although 
costs  to  individuals  (stage  two)  are  still  external  to  them. 
The  choice  of  rules  over  standards also  tends  to  reduce  the  costs  borne  by  private 
parties.  One  implication  is  that  lawsuits  may  be  less  costly,  encouraging  more  potential 
plaintiffs  to  file.  See  supra  note  35.  Of  course,  public  costs  could  be  charged  to  private 
parties  and  private  costs  could  be  subsidized,  so  the  incidence  of  costs  is  not  an  inherent 
feature  of  whether  rules  or  standards  govern.  (Who  bears  costs  may  be  relevant  for 
incentive  purposes  aside  from  the  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  suits.  For  example,  those 
developing  new  drugs  must  bear  many  of  the  costs  of  tests  that  are  submitted  to  the 
government  in  determining  whether  to  permit  their sale;  in  this  manner,  the  drug compa- 
nies  bear  the  full  cost  of  their  products.) 
144.  See  supra  note  47;  see  also  infra  note  162  (how  prior judicial  opinions  guide  a 
judicial  decision). 
145.  There  is  in  fact  important  variation  in  how  judges  are  selected  in  different  states 
(various  forms  of  election  and  appointment)  and across countries  (for  example,  the  use  of 
career judiciaries,  with  various  structures for  promotion  and  retention). 
146.  Miranda v.  Arizona,  384  U.S.  436  (1966). 
147.  410  U.S.  113  (1973). 
148.  This  difference,  however,  is less  important than may  first appear.  A  standard may 
be  applied  with  the  guidance  of  general  studies  of  a  problem  and  a  rule  may  be  de- 
signed  with  reference  to  a  single  occurrence  that  has  been  observed.  Still,  as  described  in 
subsection  I(D)(3),  standards have  the  advantage  of  access  to  concrete  facts  that may  not 
have  existed  when  a  rule  was  created.  Relatedly  and  more  broadly,  how  rules  and  stan- RULES  VERSUS STANDARDS 
It should also be emphasized that the institutional  possibilities 
are more varied than is suggested by the typical focus on legisla- 
tures and courts. First, rules are promulgated  by all three branches 
of  government. In  addition to  legislatures, courts  create  rules 
through precedents and executive agencies promulgate regulations 
and enforcement guidelines. Second, standards can be  applied by 
many agents. Executive officials-often  prosecutors-exercise  pros- 
ecutorial discretion. Legislatures can override particular decisions 
and enact private legislation. And, within courts and other adjudi- 
cative bodies, standards can be  interpreted by judges, juries, ex- 
perts, or arbitrators.149 
A  consequence of  these  latter remarks is  that many issues 
concerning the separation of powers, the operation of legislatures 
and government agencies, the exercise of prosecutorial  power, and 
the  rules of  civil and criminal procedure, are importantly inter- 
twined with the question of how a legal system can best give con- 
tent to the law. Thus, in addition to asking whether a law should 
be  promulgated as  a  rule or  a  standard, taking the  institutional 
context as given, the present analysis is relevant to  analyzing the 
reform of legal institutions.  At a narrower  level, an institution con- 
templating the enactment of a law may have choices as to which 
institutions (including itself) will design and apply the law. 
B.  Precedent  and Predictability 
Much of  the analysis has been concerned with the ability of 
individuals and lawyers to predict the application of the law and 
of adjudicators  to apply it. To the extent laws are promulgated as 
standards, predictability will  be  enhanced by  precedent to  the 
extent  precedent transforms standards into  rules.150  This  Section 
dards are optimally designed and applied is influenced by their inherent difference with 
respect to timing, as discussed throughout  Section I(D). 
149.  One effect of the choice of adjudicators  concerns the predictability  of their deci- 
sions by individuals  and lawyers.  One might suspect, for example, that juries (allegedly of 
one's peers) or arbitrators  (if, for example, they are from the same industry as the ac- 
tors)  may be  more predictable by  individuals (without the  aid  of  legal  advice) than 
judges are. On the other hand, judges may be easier for lawyers to predict, which would 
tend to lower the cost and increase the accuracy  of legal advice. See also Section III(A) 
(on the relative accessibility  of rules and standards). 
150.  There also will be uncertainties  concerning the application  of  rules that may be 
resolved through precedent-most  notably involving boundary disputes-in  which some 
condition determines which of two conflicting  rules governs. As emphasized  in the Intro- 
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offers further remarks  on precedent and on other factors influenc- 
ing how well a law's application  can be predicted.151 
1.  The  Time  Taken to  Promulgate  Precedents.152  As  empha- 
sized in Section I(C), the comparison  of rules and standards  in the 
case  when  standards become  rules  through precedent depends 
importantly  on how many acts take place before the precedent is 
established, because individuals committing such acts will not be 
guided  by  the  not-yet-established precedent.153  Presumably, the 
longer the  time, the  more such acts there will be.  In our legal 
system, this  time  period often  is  substantial. Time  passes from 
when actions are taken to when lawsuits are adjudicated.  Lawsuits 
often take years to  reach a conclusion and usually settle before- 
hand. Many levels of  appeal may have to  be  exhausted. Finally, 
courts often hesitate to make clear rulings that will cover a wide 
range of future cases.154  Instead, they may avoid a ruling on juris- 
dictional or other grounds, make a narrow ruling,155  state alterna- 
tive grounds, fail to produce a clear majority  opinion, or, with the 
duction,  rules  are  to  some  extent  standard-like,  and  the  difference  is  a  matter  of  degree. 
151.  See  also  supra  Section  III(A)  (on  the  relative  accessibility  of  rules  and  stan- 
dards); note  149  (on  the  predictability  of  adjudicators). 
152.  Precedent  is  usually  discussed  in  the  context  of  judicial  decisionmaking,  but  the 
problem  is  similar  for  adjudication  by  administrative  agencies.  Agencies,  however,  have 
the  additional  tool  of  rulemaking.  For  a  criticism of  agencies'  failure  to  promulgate  rules, 
see FRIENDLY,  supra note 9. 
153.  The  discussion  to  follow  usually  takes  precedent  to  be  an  all-or-nothing  matter, 
as  was  done  in  Section  I(C).  The  analysis  applies  directly  to  precedents  that  are  incom- 
plete-in  covering  only  some  behavior  subject  to  the  standard or  in providing  only  partial 
guidance  with  respect  to  the  behavior  covered. 
154.  Some  of  these  points  are  emphasized  in  Ehrlich  &  Posner,  supra  note  1,  at  264. 
155.  The  adoption  of  a  multi-factor  balancing  test  is  broad  to  the  extent  it  will  apply 
to  a  category  of  cases  but  narrow  in  that  each  decision  under  the  test-even  if  by  the 
highest  court  in  a  jurisdiction-has  little  precedential  value  (assuming,  as  is  usually  the 
case,  that  the  court  refrains  from  stating  the  weight  given  to  the  factors).  See,  e.g.,  Ed- 
ward Yorio,  Federal Income  Tax Rulemaking: An  Economic  Approach,  51  FORD. L.  REV. 
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Supreme Court, decline to  grant certiorari.15  Likewise, the scope 
for declaratory  judgments tends to be narrow.157 
As  with the  discussion of  institutions in Section A,  most of 
these  features reflect choices rather than inherent features of  a 
legal  system.158  The  current choices often  involve minimizing or 
postponing the establishment of precedents that will guide future 
activity.159  The  analysis here  suggests that  this  involves  a  high 
cost, as behavior in the interim will not benefit from the guidance 
of  whatever precedent might later be  set.  Also,  in  the  interim 
additional costs will be incurred, both by the many who contem- 
plate acts (in acquiring expensive, although only marginally help- 
ful, advice) and in the many adversarial  adjudications  that arise, in 
which both parties and the court will expend resources determin- 
ing how to give content to the standard. 
To make the problem of delay in issuing precedent concrete, 
consider the following example, which considers only the cost of 
lawsuits (thus understating  the benefit of an early determination). 
In the years before an issue is resolved by the creation of prece- 
dent,  suppose  there  will  be  1,000 adjudications concerning the 
contested issue that cost an average of $50,000 each-a  total cost 
of $50,000,000.  Is it likely that the later resolution will be better in 
some respect than an earlier determination  by such an amount?60 
156.  For  competing  views  on  the  virtue  of  delay  in  granting  certiorari,  see  SAMUEL 
ESTREICHER  &  JOHN SEXTON,  REDEFINING  THE SUPREME  COURT'S ROLE: A  THEORY 
OF MANAGING  THE FEDERAL  JUDICIAL  PROCESS  48,  50-52  (1986)  (favoring  percolation); 
Daniel  J.  Meador,  A  Challenge  to Judicial Architecture: Modifying  the  Regional  Design  of 
the  U.S.  Courts  of  Appeals,  56  U.  CHI. L.  REV.  603,  633-34  (1989)  (favoring  prompt 
resolution  of  conflicts  involving  statutory  interpretation). 
When  there  are  multiple  jurisdictions  (as  with  the  many  circuits  in  the  federal 
system),  there  may  arise  conflicting  precedents.  Moreover,  even  after  consistent  prece- 
dents  have  emerged  in  a  number  of  circuits, there  will  remain  some  uncertainty  as  to  the 
others  and, concomitantly,  the  possibility  that  the  Supreme  Court will  grant certiorari  in  a 
subsequent  case  and  reverse  the  circuit court  precedents. 
157.  Article  III  limitations  affect  the  availability of  declaratory judgments  and,  through 
other  doctrines,  may  increase  the  time  before  a  precedent  is  established.  These  restrictive 
doctrines  have  often  been  criticized.  See,  e.g.,  Evan  T.  Lee,  Deconstitutionalizing  Justi- 
ciability:  The  Example  of  Mootness,  105  HARV. L.  REV. 603  (1992). 
158.  For  example,  some  states  and  other  countries  allow  the  legislature  to  present 
constitutional  questions  to  the  highest  court  for  an  advance  determination. 
159.  Not  all participants  in  the  system  agree  with  such  an  approach.  See, e.g.,  Antonin 
Scalia,  The  Rule  of  Law  as  a  Law  of  Rules,  56  U.  CHI. L.  REV.  1175,  1178-80  (1989); 
cf.  DAVIS, supra  note  1,  at  109  (administrators  often  progress  from  discretion  toward 
rules  at  a  rate  behind  what  their  current understanding  makes  feasible). 
160.  It  is  commonly  believed  that  waiting  has  its  benefits,  as  the  experience  of  prior 
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Might the resolution be even more satisfactory  if a nontrivial por- 
tion  of  the  $50,000,000 were  spent  in  reaching a  careful, but 
prompt resolution of the point?161 
This example suggests that much of our legal system may be 
deficient in two respects. First, massive costs of  delay in settling 
the law are regularly incurred.  Second, costs devoted to resolving 
an issue are not channeled in a manner designed to produce the 
most informed possible result. Rather, there tends to be substantial 
duplication, with limited guidance to  actors concerning their be- 
havior in the interim. 
2.  Predictability  Without  Precedent.  A  related  concern  is 
with predictability  short of precedent. Prior cases-both  their out- 
comes  and any written opinions-may  reduce the  costs and in- 
crease the  accuracy of  legal advice and adjudication even  if  no 
"binding precedent" is  created.162  The extent of  such effects will 
depend on the manner in which the information  produced by prior 
cases is  made accessible. General verdicts by juries and rulings 
from the  bench without opinion will provide limited guidance.163 
cases  will  provide  the  basis  for  giving  content  to  standards.  See,  e.g.,  DAVIS,  supra  note 
1,  at  107-08;  OLIVER W.  HOLMES,  JR.,  THE COMMON  LAW 111-12  (1881);  Ehrlich  & 
Posner,  supra  note  1,  at 266; supra  note  156. The  text  does  not  question  this  assumption, 
the  validity  of  which  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  prior adjudications create  a  base  of 
experience.  (Many  suits  will  not,  as  they  will  be  settled,  after  significant  expenditures  on 
litigation;  others  will  produce  general  verdicts  but  no  written  opinion.  Also,  the  base  of 
experience  created  may be  biased.  See Gillian  K.  Hadfield,  Bias  in the Evolution  of  Legal 
Rules,  80  GEO. L.J.  583  (1992).)  Rather,  the  text  asks  whether  waiting  long  periods  of 
time  so  as  to  observe  the  particular cases  that  arise  is  the  most  sensible  way  to  collect 
information,  given  that  actions  in  the  interim  are  left  without  more  concrete  and  less 
costly  guidance.  (Other  ways  to  collect  information  include  studying  actual  or  contemplat- 
ed  behavior  that  has  not  given  rise  to  a  lawsuit  and been  litigated  to  a  final judgment.  If 
one  wanted  experience,  for  example,  with  train  accidents,  existing  data  may  be  little  en- 
hanced  by  one  court  record  of  an  adjudicated  case,  or  even  a  half  dozen,  some  years  in 
the  future.  See  also  supra  notes  63,  68.) 
161.  One  could  think  of  how  many  amicus  briefs  could  be  commissioned  and  exam- 
ined  and  how  many  studies  could  be  performed  for  even  a  small  fraction  of  such  an 
amount. 
162.  Cf.  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1,  at  174-81  (existence  of  a  common  law  method  of 
decisionmaking  in  which  rules  have  no  force  in  themselves  but  prior  decisions  provide 
guidance);  id.  at  182-83  (distinguishing  precedent  and  learning  from  experience);  see  also 
Richard  A.  Posner,  An  Economic  Approach  to  Legal  Procedure  and  Judicial  Administra- 
tion,  2  J.  LEGAL STUD. 399,  450  (1973)  (suggesting  that  precedents  involving  "the  com- 
pact  and  pointed  statement  communicated  by  [a]  rule"  may  communicate  accumulated 
experience  to  adjudicators more  effectively  than  leaving  them  to  extract  prior  experience 
on  their  own). 
163.  Litigators,  however,  will  learn  something  from  such  a  process.  Of  course,  even  a RULES  VERSUS STANDARDS 
This, too, reflects a choice in designing the system. Jurors could be 
asked to offer opinions or identify salient factors. Judges, especial- 
ly as they develop experience, could make informative pronounce- 
ments.64 
3.  Predictability Without Formally Articulated Rules.  The 
predictability  of  a law is determined by more than formal enact- 
ments, precedents, and even the results of past adjudications.  As 
discussed in  Section III(A),  individuals' common knowledge will 
allow confident prediction in  some  contexts, even  when precise 
official pronouncements  are not consulted or do not exist. 
Moreover, government action outside the  formal lawmaking 
processes can provide important  guidance for future behavior. For 
example, the government's undertaking  and publishing the results 
of comprehensive studies of the hazards posed by various chemi- 
cals may have a substantial effect on their use even if the results 
are not embodied in a regulation or formally binding in a negli- 
gence suit or other legal proceeding.'65  If a regulatory agency un- 
dertook such an investigation,  individuals  might expect the agency 
to  act on  the results in setting its enforcement priorities and in 
adjudicating  cases even if no rule was promulgated declaring the 
results to  be  binding.66  Undertaking such efforts is  rule-like in 
the sense used in this Article, because such efforts are an impor- 
tant aspect of giving content to the law in advance of individuals' 
actions.167  Contrast this with  a  standard-like approach, in  which 
the  agency does  not  investigate the  dangers posed  by chemicals 
very experienced  litigator in most fields of law may have tried only a handful of cases to 
verdict, and the number of other relevant variables that may have affected the outcome 
in such cases will be  relatively great. Exchanging  stories, more formal conferences, and 
publications  (by individual  litigators  and commercial  services) all allow information  to be 
pooled to a greater extent, although many of the factors that may have influenced a ver- 
dict will be lost in the process. 
164.  In some respects, the federal criminal sentencing guidelines reflect such an ap- 
proach, although the guidelines are binding. The rules (with some standard-like  aspects) 
are  based in  part on  the  prior experience of  sentencing judges. See  UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING  COMMISSION,  GUIDELINES  MANUAL 1.2-1.4  (Nov.  1990). 
165.  See,  e.g.,  FED. R.  EVID. 803(8)  (hearsay  consisting  of  public  reports  admissible); 
FRIENDLY,  supra note  9,  at  144 46  (advocating that agencies present data and make 
policy statements). 
166.  An agency may choose not to make the results binding so  that it can also con- 
sider subsequent information.  Nonetheless, substantial  predictability  would be possible, in 
contrast to the case in which no such comprehensive  study had been undertaken. 
167.  See supra Section I(E). 
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until adjudicating the  legality of  a  particular incident in  which 
chemicals were discharged  into a river. When a study is completed 
and published in  advance, individuals may use  it  to  guide their 
behavior and the agency may simply refer to it in an adjudication. 
When such a study is only to  be made after-the-fact,  individuals 
contemplating discharges of  such chemicals would have to  make 
their own investigations or  act without knowledge of  the  actual 
dangers, and the agency would have to make an inquiry in each 
adjudication. 
C.  Changing Rules and Standards over  Time 
As  available information, conditions, and  perceived values 
change over time, so  does the desired content of the law. In the 
present legal system, it is usually believed that standards  are easier 
to keep up-to-date.68  The reason is that standards are given con- 
tent in a definitive way only when they are applied to particular 
conduct. Thus, a standard  promulgated  decades ago can be applied 
to conduct in the recent past using present understandings  rather 
than those from an earlier era. In contrast,  rules must be changed, 
which may require more effort. 
The importance of changes in the law as well as the ease of 
change will  vary greatly among fields. For  example, it  may be 
quite important  to be able to change income tax rules quickly (as 
when there is a recession), and such laws are changed, often mas- 
sively, with alarming  frequency. In contrast, standards  of due care 
or  determinations of  causation will reflect old  understandings  if 
rules governing expert testimony exclude new theories.169 
Moreover, as  with  other  institutional features, the  ease  of 
change is a matter of choice. Standards  can be applied using either 
present or  past understandings.  (Note,  for  example, debates on 
questions of interpretation  about the relevance of the original in- 
tent of the framers of the Constitution or of statutes.) For rules, 
the manner of  evolution is  also chosen. Legislatures were inten- 
168.  See,  e.g.,  POSNER,  supra  note  9,  ?  20.3,  at  543; see  also  SCHAUER,  supra  note  1, 
at  140-42  (use  of  rules  involves  trade-off  between  enhancing  the  ability  of  individuals  to 
rely  and  preserving  the  ability  to  adapt  to  a  changing  future);  cf.  Hirsch,  supra  note  11, 
at  1240-41  (identifying  changing  conditions  as  an  element  limiting  the  benefit  of  precise 
advance  specification). 
169.  Book  Note,  Rebel  Without a  Cause,  105  HARV. L.  REV. 935,  937-38  (1992)  (re- 
viewing  PETER W.  HUBER, GALILEO'S  REVENGE:  JUNK SCIENCE  IN THE COURTROOM 
(1991)). 
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tionally devised  to  make  changing laws  difficult (absent  rather 
broad agreement on the need for change). But within this institu- 
tional structure,  a legislature can delegate rulemaking  authority to 
an  agency, so  that rules may be  changed more readily.170  Also, 
some  revision of  rules is  undertaken by courts,171  and this prac- 
tice could be much broader if it were thought desirable.72  Prece- 
dents interpreting  rules or giving content to standards can be re- 
spected more or  less.173  Changes in  rules or  the  typical applica- 
tion  of  standards can  be  made  prospective or  retroactive to 
varying degrees.174 
How readily laws may change or evolve will affect their pre- 
dictability and, relatedly, the  costs  incurred when  seeking  legal 
advice or when adjudicators  apply the law. The more room there 
is for argument  about changed conditions, the more such argument 
will be  offered, at greater cost and with less certainty in guiding 
behavior.'75  To  the extent the actual legal system makes one  for- 
mulation more subject to change than another, this difference will 
be relevant in choosing the optimal formulation. 
170.  See,  e.g.,  FRIENDLY,  supra  note  9,  at  7;  HART &  SACKS, supra  note  1,  at  140; 
Erik  H.  Corwin,  Congressional  Limits  on  Agency  Discretion: A  Case Study of  the Hazard- 
ous  and  Solid  Waste Amendments  of  1984,  29  HARV. J.  ON LEGIS. 517,  521-22  (1992). 
171.  See,  e.g.,  GUIDO  CALABRESI,  A  COMMON  LAW FOR THE AGE  OF  STATUTES 
(1982);  POSNER,  supra  note  1,  at  46-47. 
172.  See  CALABRESI,  supra  note  171. 
173.  For  an  empirical  assessment  of  the  degree  to  which  reliance  on  prior  decisions 
declines  with  the  passage  of  time,  see  William  M.  Landes  &  Richard  A.  Posner,  Legal 
Precedent: A  Theoretical and  Empirical Analysis,  19 J.L. &  ECON. 249  (1976).  It  is  famil- 
iar  that  an  outmoded  precedent  may  not  be  discarded  for  substantial  periods  of  time, 
sometimes  motivated  by  a  desire  to  defer  to  the  legislature  or  an  administrative  agency. 
If  such  issues  were  initially  covered  by  a  regularly  reviewed  statutory  scheme  or  set  of 
regulations,  outmoded  approaches  may  be  discarded  more  quickly. 
174.  See  generally  Richard  H.  Fallon  &  Daniel  J.  Meltzer,  New  Law,  Non-Retroactivi- 
ty, and  Constitutional Remedies,  104  HARV. L.  REV. 1731  (1991);  Louis  Kaplow,  An  Eco- 
nomic  Analysis  of  Legal  Transitions, 99  HARV. L.  REV. 509  (1986). 
175.  The  discussion  in  the  text  should  not  be  interpreted  to  suggest  that  such  uncer- 
tainty  is  necessarily  undesirable.  To  the  extent  uncertainty  concerning  application  of  the 
law  reflects  genuine  uncertainty  about  the  appropriate  content  of  the  law,  the  mixed 
signals  provided  by  the  legal  system  may  constitute  the  appropriate  guide  for  behavior. 
Cf.  Kaplow,  supra  note  174,  at  533-36  (noting  the  similarity  between  uncertainties  deriv- 
ing  from  the  market  and  those  due  to  government  actions).  There  is  more  reason  to 
doubt  whether  repeated  expenditures  at  the  enforcement  stage  on  disputes  over  whether 
conditions  have  changed  are  justified  by  the  social  benefit  of  fine-tuning  the  law  to  cur- 
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D.  Laws  Regarding Form and Background  Laws 
This  Article  focuses  on  legal  commands regulating harm- 
producing behavior. Although many points would continue to  be 
relevant, a  different analysis may be required for laws regarding 
form (for example, a requirement  that there be two witnesses to 
the  execution of  a  will for  it  to  have legal effect)176  and back- 
ground laws (for example, that contract breach gives rise to liabili- 
ty for expectation damages, unless the contract stipulates to  the 
contrary).  Often, both types of laws are designed to facilitate rath- 
er  than regulate behavior. Thus, what is  best  for  the  actors is 
deemed to be best for society."77 
An  important feature of laws regarding  form is that they be 
cheaply accessible and precisely predictable.'78  If  it  were  left  to 
an adjudicator  ex post to determine how many witnesses give one 
confidence in  a  document, the  effect  may simply be  to  induce 
actors to  expend excessive resources on  additional witnesses, be- 
cause the cost of nullification  is so great. On the other hand, be- 
cause laws of  form are often designed to  prevent fraud,179  which 
may be  easier to  commit if  there are known rigid rules that a 
fraudulent  actor can carefully  circumvent,  standards  may be prefer- 
able in  some contexts.80  Such issues suggest that an appropriate 
176.  Some  commentators  have  in  fact  distinguished  the  analysis  of  formality.  See,  e.g., 
HART,  supra  note  1,  at  130-31;  Ehrlich  &  Posner,  supra  note  1,  at  269-70;  Kennedy,  su- 
pra  note  1,  at  1697-701.  For  an  extended  discussion  of  rules  versus  standards  in  a  con- 
text  involving  contract  formalities,  see  Douglas  G.  Baird  &  Robert  Weisberg,  Rules,  Stan- 
dards,  and  the  Battle  of  the  Forms:  A  Reassessment  of  ?  2-207,  68  VA.  L.  REV.  1217 
(1982). 
177.  For  contracts,  it  may  simply  be  that  there  are  no  externalities.  For  wills  or  other 
gratuitous  transfers, other  parties  will  be  affected,  but  a judgment  may  be  made  that  it  is 
best  to  allow  donors  to  govern  their  own  affairs. See  Steven  Shavell,  An  Economic  Anal- 
ysis  of  Altruism  and  Deferred  Gifts, 20  J.  LEGAL  STUD. 401  (1991)  (arguing  that  donors 
should  be  able  to  bind  themselves  to  give  gifts). 
178.  The  relative  accessibility  of  rules  and  standards is  discussed  in  subsection  I(A)(2) 
and  Section  III(A). 
179.  Familiar  examples  include  the  statute  of  frauds  and  parol  evidence  rule  in  con- 
tract law. See generally  3 SAMUEL  WILLISTON,  A  TREATISE  ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
? 448  (statute  of  frauds); 4  id.  ? 631  (parol  evidence). 
180.  For  example,  there  are  general  prohibitions  on  fraud  in  contract  law,  and  the 
federal  income  tax  has  quite  open-ended  standards  (in  addition  to  more  particular rules) 
concerning  sham  transactions.  See,  e.g.,  POSNER,  supra  note  1,  at  56-60  (raising  question 
of  whether  more  detailed  legislation  and  regulation  or  more  ex post  plugging  of  loopholes 
by  courts  is  better  course  for  federal  taxation);  supra  note  125  (that  rules  are  more  pre- 
dictable  implies  that  errors  in  the  law  will  be  more  predictable).  Consider  a  complex 
standard  that  prohibits  types  of  fraud  or  circumvention  of  parties'  or  legislatures'  intent. RULES  VERSUS STANDARDS 
framework, taking into account effects on  legitimate and fraudu- 
lent  behavior, would  differ from  the  one  presented here.  Yet, 
some factors will be the same. Most important  is that laws of form 
often  regulate extremely numerous acts and transactions, so  the 
cost savings from ex ante creation of the law (rules) will be partic- 
ularly significant. 
Background laws raise different issues, and therefore would 
require that yet another framework be  created. For example, an 
open-ended standard providing that ambiguity and incompleteness 
in contracts will be supplemented by courts ex post in the manner 
parties would have agreed to had they provided for the contingen- 
cy  has  desirable properties. When parties contemplate entering 
into a contractual relationship, they have only a  limited need to 
know how a  court would fill gaps in  their agreement,'81  as  long 
as the court (or another designated decisionmaker)  could be antici- 
pated to  act  as  they  would wish.82 The  primary reason parties 
leave much unspecified is precisely to avoid the costs of specifica- 
tion. This cost  savings would be  nullified (or  exceeded)  if  they 
invested in legal advice to  inform themselves about how a  court 
would provide for unspecified events. Thus, the calculus determin- 
ing whether rules or standards  are preferable would emphasize ex 
Applying  such  a  law  in  enforcement  proceedings  may  often  be  costly.  But  if  actors  an- 
ticipated  that  such  a  law  would  be  applied  well  (and  if  they  knew  rather well  which  acts 
were  fraudulent  or  circumventions),  they  might  be  deterred  from  such  activity.  Then 
enforcement  costs  may  not  be  incurred very  often  and  costs  of  legal  advice  also  may  be 
modest  if  lawyers  could  predict  with  reasonable  confidence  that  questionable  schemes 
simply  were  not  worth  the  bother.  The  problem  is  that,  if  it  is  not  sufficiently  clear  ex 
ante  or  ex post  which  schemes  are  indeed  improper,  those  engaged  in  possibly  legitimate 
behavior  may  incur  substantial  legal  costs  to  verify  that  their  conduct  is  permissible  or 
simply  be  deterred  from  committing  desirable  activity.  Similarly,  legitimate  schemes  may 
often  be  challenged  in  enforcement  proceedings  using  such  standards. 
181.  To  determine  what  price  is  acceptable,  they  will  care  about  the  expected  value  of 
the  contract,  which  will  depend  on  how  each  contingency  would  be  addressed.  But  a 
reasonably  good  approximation  may  be  possible  without  a  prediction  of  how  each  contin- 
gency  would  be  resolved.  If one  party is  more  informed  of  the  background  rules,  perhaps 
because  it  is  sensible  to  be  more  knowledgeable  when  one  enters  into  such  transactions 
repeatedly,  that  party  might  have  an  advantage,  which  in  turn  may  affect  what  the  other 
party  is  willing  to  offer  or  may  induce  the  other  party  to  acquire  additional  advice  to 
determine  whether  there  might  exist  important background  rules  that would  operate  to  its 
disadvantage. 
182.  See  David  Chamy,  Hypothetical  Bargains:  The  Normative  Structure of  Contract 
Interpretation, 89  MICH. L.  REV. 1815,  1819-23  (1991);  David  Charny, Nonlegal  Sanctions 
in  Commercial  Relationships,  104  HARV. L.  REV. 373,  444  (1990);  Steven  Shavell,  Dam- 
age  Measures for  Breach  of  Contract, 11  BELL J.  ECON. 466,  466-69  (1980). 
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ante promulgation  costs and ex post enforcement costs, giving less 
attention to  costs of  advice by contracting parties because they 
often would not choose to acquire advice about such matters.183 
E.  Lawyers' Interest in How  the Law Is Formulated 
The  legal profession is  not  indifferent to  how  laws are de- 
signed. Since some  of  the  promulgation costs and much of  the 
costs of advice and enforcement consist of fees for lawyers' servic- 
es, the profession as a whole has a general interest that tends to 
oppose that of society. Laws that induce individuals  to seek advice 
more frequently or to seek advice having a higher cost,84  or that 
increase the cost of  litigation, will be favorable to  the economic 
interest of  lawyers."8  Thus, while the bar will often have special 
expertise in evaluating many of the factors relevant to the design 
of laws, one must keep in mind that lawyers' advice on such mat- 
ters may be tinged by self-interest.86 
183.  If  they  had  reason  to  believe  that  their  preferences  were  atypical,  and  thus 
would  not  be  reflected  in  the  rules  or  in  an  adjudicator's  application  of  the  standard, 
they  would  want  to  include  special  provisions.  But  some  advice  may be  necessary  to  have 
a  sense  of  whether  one's  situation  is  likely  to  be  atypical.  Sometimes,  however,  it  might 
be  cheapest  simply  to  include  such  provisions  in  the  contract  without  incurring the  cost 
to  determine  whether  they  are  necessary.  Thus,  many  contracts  contain  extensive 
boilerplate  providing  for  the  result  an  adjudicator would  likely  reach  in  any  event. 
184.  These  factors  oppose  each  other  to  some  extent,  because  higher  costs  of  advice 
tend  to  decrease  the  demand  for  it.  It  remains  true,  however,  that  there  is  a  divergence 
of  interests,  because  laws  that  maximize  expenditures  on  legal  advice  are  unlikely  to  be 
those  that  are  socially  best  (particularly as  expenditures  on  legal  advice  are  a  social  cost, 
though  a  private  benefit  to  the  profession). 
185.  See,  e.g.,  Ehrlich  &  Posner,  supra  note  1,  at  271,  274  (emphasizing  that  lawyers 
may  prefer judge-made  law  because  precedents,  which  state  rules  implicitly,  require  more 
legal  skill  to  master  than  statutes).  See generally Michelle  J. White,  Legal  Complexity and 
Lawyers'  Benefit from  Litigation,  12  INT'L REV. L.  &  ECON. 381  (1992). 
186.  Any  individual  lawyer  would  have  little  interest  in  the  formulation  (unless  there 
is  extreme  specialization),  but  lawyers  often  act  as  a  group  through  professional  associa- 
tions.  Lawyers  may  also  have  different  interests  depending  on  their  past  investments  in 
learning  rule  systems  or  in  predicting  standards.  See  supra  notes  40,  163.  Finally,  it  is 
unethical  for  a  lawyer  (not  representing  a  client)  to  advocate  reforms  in  the  profession's 
self-interest  that  are  not  believed  to  be  in  the  public  interest,  see  MODEL  CODE  OF  PRO- 
FESSIONAL  RESPONSIBILITY  EC  8-4  (1980);  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL  CONDUCT 
Rule  6.4  (1989);  however,  lawyers'  perceptions  of  the  public  interest  may  be  influenced 
by  their self-interest  and  the  effect  of  ethical  guidelines  on  such  behavior  is speculative  in 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article provides an economic analysis of rules and stan- 
dards, focusing on  the  extent to  which the  law should be  given 
content  before  individuals act  (rules), rather than waiting until 
afterward (standards). The problem motivating the choice is that 
giving appropriate  content to the law often requires effort, whether 
in analyzing a problem, resolving value conflicts, or acquiring  em- 
pirical knowledge. Undertaking such  effort  in  advance involves 
additional  costs, but results in savings when individuals  must deter- 
mine how the law applies to their contemplated conduct and when 
adjudicators  must apply the law to past conduct. 
The  central factor influencing the  desirability of  rules  and 
standards is  the  frequency with  which a  law  will  govern  con- 
duct.187  If conduct will be frequent, the additional costs of design- 
ing rules-which  are borne once-are  likely to be exceeded by the 
savings realized each time the rule is applied. Thus, rules involve a 
wholesale approach  to an information  problem, that of determining 
the law's appropriate content.88  Standards  instead require adjudi- 
cators to undertake this effort, which may have to be done repeat- 
edly (unless the standard  is transformed  into a rule through prece- 
dent189).  And, regardless of whether adjudication  will be frequent, 
many individuals contemplating behavior that may be  subject to 
the law will find it more costly to comply with standards,  because 
it generally is more difficult to  predict the  outcome of  a  future 
inquiry (by the adjudicator,  into the law's content) than to exam- 
ine  the  result of  a  past inquiry."90  They must either spend more 
to be guided properly or act without as much guidance as under 
rules. Thus, when behavior subject to the relevant law is frequent, 
standards  tend to be more costly and result in behavior that con- 
forms less well to underlying  norms. 
If  behavior subject to  the  law is  infrequent, however, stan- 
dards are likely to be preferable. Of particular  relevance are laws 
for which behavior varies greatly, so that most relevant scenarios 
are unlikely ever to occur. Determining the appropriate  content of 
the law for all such contingencies  would be expensive, and most of 
187.  See  supra  Sections  I(B),  III(B). 
188.  See supra  Section  I(E). 
189.  See  supra  Section  I(C);  subsection  IV(B)(1). 
190.  On  the  possibility  that  standards  can  be  more  accessible  to  individuals,  see  Sec- 
tion  III(A). 
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the expense would be wasted. It would be preferable to wait until 
particular  circumstances  arise. 
Some implications of  this analysis run contrary to  prevailing 
wisdom or suggest problems with common practices. Thus, it  is 
usually said that standards result in  more precise application of 
underlying norms because they can be  applied to  the  particular 
facts of a case, in contrast to rules, which apply to the generality 
of  cases. But if the cases are anticipated to  arise frequently and 
have  important recurring characteristics,  rules will  not  only  be 
preferable, but might be  expected to  be  more precise.19'  In such 
instances, it is worth investing substantial  effort to fine-tune a rule 
system. But, with standards,  it may not be worth spending much 
effort to get precise results, because such efforts will be useful in 
resolving only a single case rather than many. Moreover, even in 
instances where standards  would produce more accurate results in 
adjudication, rules may  nevertheless produce behavior more  in 
accord with underlying  norms. The reason is simply that the rules, 
announced in advance, are more likely to influence actual behav- 
ior, whereas individuals  may find it infeasible or too costly to pre- 
dict how an adjudicator  will apply a  standard to  their behavior. 
The  discussion noted  OSHA  regulations and the  tax  code  and 
regulations as  examples of  rule schemes likely to  be  far more 
precise in their application  than the results one would expect to be 
produced by juries operating under a general standard.92 
The analysis also is relevant to  the processes by which laws 
are  given  content,  including through precedent."93  When  a  law 
will  govern much behavior, there are substantial benefits to  an 
early determination  of its content. When legislators leave the de- 
tails of  law to  courts (or to  agencies that do not promptly issue 
regulations"94),  individuals may  be  left  with  little  guidance for 
years or decades, while substantial  legal costs are incurred  both in 
providing advice to actors and in adjudicating  disputes over unre- 
solved questions. Similar costs are imposed when courts delay in 
promulgating  precedents-whether by avoiding a decision or decid- 
191.  See supra  subsection  I(D)(3);  Section  II(D). 
192.  To  be  sure,  individual jury verdicts  under  such  a  standard would  be  more  varied 
due  to  inconsistencies.  See supra  Section  II(A).  But  it  is  unlikely  that  any jury would  go 
into  such  detail  with  respect  to  the  factors  giving  rise  to  the  content  of  these  rule 
schemes. 
193.  See  supra  Section  I(C);  subsection  IV(B)(1). 
194.  See  FRIENDLY,  supra note  9. 
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ing  narrowly. Delay  to  a  more  convenient time,  perhaps when 
there will be more experience, is considered a virtue. Whether the 
benefits are  warranted by  the  interim legal  costs  receives little 
attention; costs involving individuals'  attempts to comply with the 
law, in  contrast to  costs of  adjudicated cases, receive even  less. 
Moreover,  when  the  law  is  finally  given  content,  even  in 
precedent-setting cases in  the  Supreme Court, the  investment in 
reaching a  correct decision is rarely in proportion to  the magni- 
tude of the stakes. And the investment is usually a trivial fraction 
of the total costs incurred  in previous duplicative  disputes over the 
same issue. 
While the legal system, including the courts, is generally un- 
derstood as  a  producer of  law, basic considerations of  efficient 
production-here,  of  an  information product195-are foreign  to 
most commentary on  rules and standards.19  Legal costs and the 
extent to which individuals  will conform their behavior to the law 
are, to be sure, not the only relevant factors in choosing between 
rules and standards.  They are, however, more significant than may 
first appear, because many of the institutional considerations usu- 
ally thought to bear on the choice can be, and sometimes are, ad- 
dressed separately from whether efforts to give content to the law 
are undertaken before or after individuals  act. 
195.  See  supra  Section  I(E). 
196.  It  would  be  useful  to  compare  the  manner  in  which  the  laws  of  states  are  pro- 
duced  to  that  in  which  large  corporations  produce  their  own  rules  and  standards  for 
internal  operations.  While  there  are  many  important  differences,  the  similarities  are  suffi- 
ciently  great  that  the  comparison  should  not  be  ignored. 
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix formally presents an example of the kind ana- 
lyzed in Part I. No attempt is made here to repeat the motivation, 
interpretation,  or numerous caveats that appear in the body of the 
Article. For completeness, the  presentation includes the  case  in 
which the  first adjudication creates a  precedent for  subsequent 
enforcement proceedings,  as described in Section I(C). In addition, 
the  particular law  that  is  chosen  (strict liability, with  damages 
equal to  harm caused) is  one  for  which the  private and social 
values of  legal advice are equal. (See  the  discussion in  Section 
III(C).) 
The Example 
The government  enacts a law subjecting  a harm-causing  activi- 
ty to strict tort liability. Initially, the government does not know 
the level of harm h caused by this activity;  it is believed that harm 
is distributed according to the density f(.)  on [0, oo). It may pro- 
mulgate a standard,  which simply means that courts will determine 
h when individuals are sued. Or, it may promulgate a rule, which 
states the level of damages a court will award. In order to promul- 
gate a rule, the government must first undertake an investigation, 
which determines the  actual h.197 The  cost  of  promulgating the 
law is ki, where  i  =  r, s  (denoting  "rule" and "standard"); kr >  ks. 
Let  k =  kr - ks. 
There are n identical risk-neutral  individuals  who engage in an 
activity that causes harm h with probability  p.  Individuals decide 
how  much care to  exercise; expenditures on  care x  reduce the 
probability  of  harm  at  a  diminishing  rate: p'(x)  <  0,  p"(x)  >  0. 
Individuals  do not know the level of damages a court will award; 
they know only the distribution  f('). Before choosing their level of 
care, they may obtain advice, which tells them what a court will 
award, at a cost of c,, where i =  r, s; c,  >  Cr; and c  =  cs -  cr.  In- 
dividuals  decide whether to acquire information  and choose a level 
of care to minimize the sum of their cost of care, their expected 
liability costs, and the cost of information. 
197.  The  example  is  more  general  than  may  first  appear.  Consider,  for  example,  the 
possibility  that  h  has  two  possible  values,  one  of  which  is  zero.  Then,  the  inquiry  is 
equivalent  to  determining  which  acts  are  harmful and  thus  subject  to  legal  sanctions. 
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Individuals who cause harm pay damages equal to the actual 
value of  h.  The  cost  of  an enforcement proceeding is  ei, where 
i = r, s; es > er; and e = es - er. 
Finally, when there is  a  standard, the  analysis will consider 
two  possibilities concerning the  first court determination of  the 
actual level of h. First, it might be a precedent for future enforce- 
ment  actions, in  which event  the  situation thereafter will be  as 
though a  rule rather than a standard prevails. (That is, enforce- 
ment costs in the future will be er and future costs of information 
will  be  cr.198) Second,  it  may  not  be  a  precedent,  in  which  event 
the standard  prevails indefinitely. 
The social objective is the minimization  of the sum of the cost 
of care, expected harm, and all legal costs-the  costs of promulgat- 
ing the law, individuals'  expenditures to learn h, and the costs of 
enforcement proceedings. 
Individuals'  Behavior 
If individuals act without becoming informed of  the actual h 
(and thus the  amount of  damages a court will award), they will 
choose a level of care xu ("u" for "uninformed")  to minimize the 
sum of  the cost of care and expected damage payments, so  their 
expected total cost will be 
0 
If they first acquire advice, they will learn the actual h and choose 
the level of care x&(h)  ("i" for "informed")  to minimize the sum of 
the cost of care and expected damage payments, and their expect- 
ed total cost will be 
(2)  Ci = f [xi(h) + p(xi(h))h]f(h)dh. 
0 
Observe that the expressions for Cu and Ci measure both the 
private and social costs (aside from enforcement costs'99)  in each 
case for the familiar reason that strict liability requires individuals 
198.  It would be straightforward  to consider the situation in which the precedential  ef- 
fect lowered subsequent enforcement costs but not individuals'  information  costs, or the 
converse, or that in which enforcement  or information  costs were reduced but not com- 
pletely to the level under a rule. See, e.g., infra note 204. 
199.  See supra note 117. 
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to pay damages for all harm caused, and because, in this model, 
actual court awards will equal actual harm under both a rule and 
a  standard. Thus, both the  expected private and expected social 
values of information  are given by the same expression: 
(3)  I =  Cu-  Ci. 
It is apparent  that I must be positive, because informed individuals 
are able to choose their level of care with knowledge of h.' 
Individuals  will  choose  to  become  informed  whenever 
I >  c,.2?0  Thus,  there  are  three  cases  to  consider:  I  <  c,  <  c,; 
c, < Cs  <  I;  and cr  <  I  <  c,.  In the first case, individuals do  not 
become informed regardless of the formulation of the law; in the 
second, they become informed regardless of the formulation;  and, 
in the third, they become informed if  there is a  rule but not  if 
there is a standard. 
Case 1: Individuals  Do  Not  Become  Informed  Either  Under a 
Rule  or  Under  a  Standard.  Because  uninformed  individuals  do 
not incur the costs c, and take the same level of care x, regardless 
of  whether a  rule or  standard prevails, the  only  considerations 
pertinent to  the  relative efficiency of  rules versus standards are 
promulgation  costs kc,  and enforcement  costs ei. 
Precedent.  If there will be at least one enforcement proceed- 
ing, a rule will be more expensive than a standard  if and only if 
(4)  k > e. 
That is, rules are more expensive when the cost of determining  the 
actual h at the promulgation  stage exceeds that of determining  the 
actual h  at the enforcement stage. To  the extent that there is a 
significant probability that there would never be  an enforcement 
proceeding under a standard,  however, a standard  would likely be 
less expensive.2 
200.  It  is  straightforward  to  show  (from  the  first-order  conditions  when  (1)  and  (2) 
are  minimized  with  respect  to  the  choice  of  x)  that  informed  individuals  choose  a  differ- 
ent  level  of  care  whenever  h  does  not  equal  the  mean  of  h-more  (less)  care  when  h  is 
greater  (less)  than  the  mean  of  h. 
201.  Choice  in  cases  of  indifference  are  stipulated  for  convenience,  without  affecting 
the  analysis.  It  is  implicitly  assumed  that  individuals  either  know  whether  a  rule  or 
standard  prevails  or  that  finding  out  the  type  of  formulation  is  costless. 
202.  There  will  be  at  least  one  proceeding  with  probability  1  -  (1  - p(x,))",  which  will 
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No precedent.  The expected cost of a rule will exceed that for 
a standard  if and only if 
(5)  k > np(xu)e. 
Using as a baseline the case in which k = e, the inequality (5) will 
hold when the expected number of suits, np(xJ),  is less than one. 
Case 2: Individuals  Become  Informed  both  Under a  Rule  and 
Under a  Standard.  Because informed individuals take the  same 
level of care, x,(h), regardless of whether a rule or standard pre- 
vails, the considerations  pertinent to the relative efficiency of rules 
versus standards are promulgation costs  ki, information costs  ci, 
and enforcement costs e,. 
Precedent. If there will be at least one enforcement proceed- 
ing, a rule will be more expensive than a standard  if and only if 
(6)  k >  Ac + e, 
where h is the expected number of individuals  who act before the 
first enforcement proceeding.23  Using  as  a  baseline the  case  in 
which k = e, a standard  will be more expensive than a rule by the 
amount hc.2  Observe that if there is never an enforcement pro- 
ceeding, the  standard saves the  promulgation cost differential k, 
but it still may be  more expensive because the  information cost 
differential  c will then be incurred  n times. 
No precedent.  The expected cost of a rule will exceed that for 
a standard  if and only if 
(7)  k > nc + npe, 
where p  denotes the expected probability  of accidents when indi- 
viduals are informed. (Recall that x, is a function of h; hence, p  is 
almost  equal  1  if  n  is  sufficiently  large. 
203.  Obviously,  h  is  greater  than  or  equal  to  one.  The  value  of  A will  depend  on  the 
actual  h,  because  the  probability  of  harm  depends  on  h  when  individuals  are  informed. 
When  p(x,(h))  is  very  small,  A will  be  large  and  the  cost  differential  noted  in  the  text 
will  be  substantial. 
204.  If,  after  a  precedent,  there  was  still  some  additional  information  cost  under  a 
standard-because  a  precedent  was  more  expensive  to  identify  than  a  rule-there  would 
be  an  added  component  of  n  -  A times  this  differential. 
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the expectation of p(x,(h)) over h.) Using as a baseline the case in 
which k = e, a necessary condition for (7) to hold is that the ex- 
pected number of suits, np, is less than one. This is not sufficient, 
because any cost advantage of  a standard would have to  exceed 
nc, which can be very large even when np  is small. A rule can be 
more expensive than a standard only if the additional promulga- 
tion costs exceed each individual's  information cost savings by a 
factor exceeding n. 
Case  3:  Individuals  Become  Informed  Under a  Rule  but  Not 
Under a  Standard. This case differs from the first two because 
behavior is no longer the same under a rule and a standard.  Un- 
der a rule, individuals  spend c, and choose the level of care xi(h). 
Under a standard,  individuals  make no expenditure  on information 
and choose the level of care xu, which in general results in a dif- 
ferent probability of  harm than when individuals are  informed. 
The  difference in  effect on  social welfare for each individual is 
simply I  -  c,,  because the  expected social value  of  information 
(abstracting  from enforcement costs) equals I. This captures both 
the difference in the level of expected harm and the difference in 
the level of care. Moreover, in case 3, it must be that I  >  c,, so 
the effect on social welfare of each individual's  behavior under a 
rule, including the information acquisition cost, is more desirable 
than under a standard. 
Precedent.  If there will be at least one enforcement proceed- 
ing, a rule will be more expensive than a standard  if and only if 
(8)  k > + (I - cr) + e. 
Expression (8)  is  the same as expression (4)  (for case 1, prece- 
dent)  except  that  the  term  h(I  - cr), which  is  positive,  appears  on 
the  right. Thus, when  the  benefit of  information is  sufficiently 
great that individuals acquire information under a  rule (but not 
under a standard),  the relative desirability  of a rule is greater than 
when they do not. It is also useful to compare expression (8) with 
expression (6).  The  difference is  that, with regard to  the  stage 
involving individual behavior, the  benefit of  rules in  case  3  in- 
volves the improvement  in behavior net of information  costs, while 
in case 2 it involves the relative cost savings in becoming informed 
about rules rather than standards. 
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No precedent.  The expected cost of a rule will exceed that for 
a standard  if and only if 
(9)  k > n(I  - c,) + n(p(x.)e,  -  pe,). 
The left side of (9) is the additional promulgation  cost of a rule. 
The first component on the right side is the net benefit concerning 
behavior (the behavioral benefit I  minus the cost of  information 
Cr)  for all individuals who act. The second component is the net 
enforcement cost difference, which is formally ambiguous because 
the  relative magnitudes of p(x.)  and p  cannot be  determined a 
priori. (Informed individuals  take more care and thus cause harm 
less frequently when they learn that h is above average and take 
less  care, causing harm more often,  when  they  learn that h  is 
below average.) If one considers the case in which these probabili- 
ties  are equal, this second component favors rules in  the  same 
manner as in the prior two cases.205 
205.  See  also  supra  note  117. 
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